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The events of September 11, 2001, forever changed the political and legal re-
sponses to terrorism. After more than ten years, two wars, numerous targeted 
military strikes, and significantly increased surveillance, we have not stopped the 
growth of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. The War on Terror has 
involved more than military operations. To stop terrorism, it is imperative to cut off 
its funding stream. To this end, a number of nations have created financial laws 
that prohibit the formation of anonymous companies and monitor suspicious bank 
transfers. Though these laws have been touted as evidence that we are winning the 
War on Terror, this Article questions their efficacy. In particular, this Article 
demonstrates how easy it is to form a terrorist finance network and to exploit the 
impotence of these international and domestic financial regulations. The Article 
presents findings from the largest global, randomized controlled trial on this issue to 
date. In our experiment, we acted as customers seeking to form anonymous shell 
companies in a variety of scenarios resulting in either greater risk or greater reward. 
On the whole, forming an anonymous shell company is as easy as ever, despite 
increased regulations following September 11. The results are disconcerting and 
demonstrate that we are far from a world that is safe from terror.
 
The research design for this experiment was registered on March 2, 2011, with ISPS, prior to 
the beginning of the Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAP) registry but was grandfathered 
into EGAP later. Registration pages for ISPS and EGAP, respectively, are at http://isps.yale.edu/ 
research/projects/p11-001#.UT39V9F4ZxF and http://e-gap.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/20110302_NFSB_ 
Compliance.pdf. Of those interventions registered, we report on the Placebo, Terrorism, FATF, 
and IRS conditions in this Article. All other interventions outlined in the registered document are 
reported in other work. In our registration, we indicated that we would report results dichoto-
mously as compliant or noncompliant, given a response. In this Article, we still report response 
and nonresponse along with a compliance level, but we expanded the set of possible types of 
compliance (nonresponse, noncompliance, partial compliance, compliance, and refusal). Presenting 
the information this way is both more precise and consistent with the registry document because 
the fuller set of outcomes contains all information the dichotomized measures capture. University 
and Institutional Review Board Clearances were received on July 7, 2010. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Financing—particularly, a secure financing network—is crucial for terror 
organizations.1 To finance its international operations, al-Qaeda requires an 
estimated $30–$50 million per year. 2  Establishing al-Qaeda’s financing 
network was one of Osama bin Laden’s earliest and most important accom-
plishments3 because it provided millions in “steady and secure” income to 
the organization.4 Not every act of terrorism, however, requires terrorist 
organizations to spend great sums of money. For instance, the September 11 
attacks cost al-Qaeda approximately $400,000–$500,000,5 but “[t]he London 
transit bombings on July 7, 2005, only cost about $15,000.”6 Because terrorists 
 
1 In a 2007 interview, former al-Qaeda Chief Treasurer Sheik Saeed declared that “funding is 
the mainstay of jihad.” Ari Shapiro, Morning Edition: Obama Stays the Course on Terrorist Financing 
(NPR radio broadcast Mar. 11, 2009, 12:17 AM), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=101676777. 
2 JIMMY GURULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING 
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 3 (2008); NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 169-72 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT], available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf; see also NICK RIDLEY, 
TERRORIST FINANCING: THE FAILURE OF COUNTER MEASURES 1-2 (2012) (“[E]fforts 
against terrorist financing tend to be focused on assessing and calculating individual operational 
costs, and the significance of auxiliary support or infrastructure is not yet fully apparent to 
organizations and agencies engaged in counter terrorism.”).  
3 See INDEP. TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TERRORIST FINANC-
ING 6 (2002) [hereinafter CFR, TERRORIST FINANCING], available at http://www.cfr.org/terrorist- 
financing/terrorist-financing/p5080 (explaining that al-Qaeda is difficult to attack, in part because 
it is “continuously replenishing its coffers”). 
4 JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 30 
(2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf. 
5 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 169; see also ROTH ET AL., supra note 4, at 13 
(noting further that of that sum, “approximately $300,000 was deposited into U.S. bank accounts 
of the 19 hijackers”).  
6 Greg Bruno, Al-Qaeda’s Financial Pressures, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 1, 
2010), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaedas-financial-pressures/p21347; cf. Michael 
Buchanan, London Bombs Cost Just Hundreds, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/uk/4576346.stm (estimating that the attacks cost only several hundred British pounds).  
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can accomplish enormously destructive attacks with very little money, a 
successful war on terror must reach deep into the financial heart of terrorism. 
Though terror attacks are often inexpensive, the efforts to prevent them 
are not. To combat terrorism and drain the pipeline of funds, the United 
States has frozen al-Qaeda’s U.S. assets7 and spent more than $1.2 trillion 
since 9/11 on its major military and diplomatic operations abroad, as well as 
“medical care for Iraq and Afghan war veterans.”8 The overall costs of 
fighting terrorism have compounded the national deficit 9  and greatly 
impacted the financial markets.10 One group of commentators has even 
called this fight the “three trillion dollar war.”11 This is not to mention the 
other costs of terrorism, including the cost to civil liberties of security 
measures.12 Terrorism’s financial impact reaches far beyond U.S. borders; other 
 
7 David L. Greene, U.S. Freezes bin Laden Assets, BALT. SUN, Sept. 25, 2001, at 1A. 
8 AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33110, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANI-
STAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11, at 1 (2011). 
9 Jacqueline Leo, Bin Laden Cost U.S. Trillions, Affecting Deficit, FISCAL TIMES (May 2, 2011), 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/05/02/Bin-Laden-Cost-US-Trillions-Affecting-Deficit; see 
also JOHN MUELLER & MARK STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING 
THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2011) (estimating the 
enhanced costs of homeland security in the decade after 9/11 at more than $1 trillion). 
10 See Michael J. Mandel et al., The Cost of Fighting Terrorism, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 16, 
2002, at 26 (“[B]oth the stock market and the labor market are weaker than they were before 
September 11 . . . .”). 
11 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: 
THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT (2008); see also Linda J. Bilmes & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Op-Ed., America’s Costly War Machine, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2011/sep/18/opinion/la-oe--bilmes-war-cost-20110918 (“[T]he United States has spent more than 
$2.5 trillion on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . .”).  
12 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 72-75 (2003) (discussing proposed security pro-
grams that would endanger civil liberties, such as the Terrorist Information and Protection System 
that would enlist private citizens to spy on their neighbors); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMP-
SEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY 147-76 (2002) (finding that the expansion of law enforcement powers 
of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 through the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), “reflects 
an overreaction all too typical in American history[,] . . . cast[ing] a cloak over the exercise of 
government power by removing limitations and judicial controls on investigative authorities, and 
short-circuit[ing] procedures designed to protect the innocent and punish the guilty”); Norman C. 
Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 370-71 (2005) (expressing 
concern over the effect the “blur[ring of] the line between a military and law enforcement 
response to terrorism” has on civil liberties); Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties and the War on 
Terrorism, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2-14 (2005) (discussing detention of individuals without due 
process and other costs imposed on civil liberties by the PATRIOT Act); Christopher Edley, Jr., 
The New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/11 (describing the spread of racial profiling after 
September 11), in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERROR-
ISM 170, 170-74 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003); Wendy Pollack, The True Cost of 
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nations have also spent billions of dollars combating it.13 The United Kingdom, 
for instance, spends an estimated £3.5 billion per year to fight terrorism.14 
Though the United States has spent enormous sums to fight terrorism 
with its military might, many are concerned that it has not invested suffi-
cient resources in cutting off the true lifeline of terrorism: its clandestine 
network of global financing.15 As this Article examines in great detail, one of 
the most dangerous and accessible financial tools used by terrorists today is 
the anonymous shell company.16 These companies allow terrorists to disguise 
their identities and covertly transfer funds—even within U.S. banks—toward 
illegal activities. Shell companies pose particularly vexing problems for law 
enforcement because there is often no way to trace them to individuals.17 The 
 
Fighting Terrorism, WALL ST. J. BLOGS: THE INFORMED READER (Sept. 21, 2007), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/informedreader/2007/09/21/the-true-cost-of-fighting-terrorism (“The Sept. 11 
attacks have encouraged democracies to tolerate physical abuse of suspected terrorists . . . .”). 
13 See, e.g., Tom Hyland, Terror Fight Costs $30 Billion, AGE (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.theage.com.au/ 
national/terror-fight-costs-30-billion-20110910-1k3ez.html (estimating that Australia has spent nearly 
$30 billion fighting terrorism since 9/11). 
14 Andy McSmith, Home Office: Cost of Fighting Terrorism Triples to £3.5bn by 2010, INDE-
PENDENT (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/home-office-cost-of-
fighting-terrorism-triples-to-pound35bn-by-2010-396473.html.  
15 See, e.g., CFR, TERRORIST FINANCING, supra note 3, at 2-3 (“[T]he current administra-
tion appears to have made a policy decision not to use the full power of U.S. influence to pressure 
or compel other governments to combat terrorist financing more effectively.”); RAPHAEL PERL, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33160, COMBATING TERRORISM: THE CHALLENGE OF 
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS 2-3 (2007) (noting that even the seizure of terrorist funds may 
not indicate progress toward eradicating terrorism, since this may not affect the terrorists’ ability 
to raise additional financing for expansion); MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS21902, TERRORIST FINANCING: THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 1-2 (2004) 
(“The slowdown in the amounts frozen reflects numerous changes in how Al Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups finance their activities. Terrorist organizations are increasingly relying on informal 
methods of money transfer, and regional cells have begun independently generating funds through 
criminal activity.”); Michael Jacobson & Matthew Levitt, Staying Solvent: Assessing Al-Qaeda’s 
Financial Portfolio, JANE’S STRATEGIC ADVISORY SERVS., Nov. 2009, at 9, 12-13 (“Al-Qaeda has 
at times also resorted to more creative means of fundraising, including complicated internet-based 
transactions and cell phone solicitations.”). 
16 See, e.g., FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI–
MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL, app. F at F-1 (2010), available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/bsa_aml_man_2010.pdf (listing shell companies 
as a “red flag” for terrorist financing); FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE ROLE 
OF DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 11-13 (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/ 
files/LLCAssessment_FINAL.pdf (pointing out that the lack of adequate legal reporting 
requirements for LLCs contributes to their continued success as shell companies that facilitate 
illegal activity); They Sell Sea Shells, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2012, at 69, 69 (noting that, despite 
their legitimate uses, shell companies “can also be misused—for tax evasion, money laundering, 
sanctions-busting or terrorism”).  
17 See, e.g., EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY 
INITIATIVE, THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE LEGAL STRUCTURES TO 
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only tangible component of a shell company may be a post office box; in 
other words, shell corporations are often “hollow” companies. 18  Shell 
corporations can serve some legitimate purposes, such as facilitating 
mergers, enabling international joint ventures, and serving as asset-holding 
companies.19 However, because they are “hollow,” they are commonly used 
as vehicles for corruption, money laundering, and, more recently, terrorism. 
Although many of these organizations seem harmless when they are created, 
posing as charities or legitimate businesses, they often become involved in 
illicit activities and frequently lead law enforcement investigations to dead 
ends.20 In an effort to combat terrorist financing, policymakers have begun 
identifying vulnerabilities in financial institutions and the ways in which 
terrorists have exploited them.21 New legislation has pushed for financial 
 
HIDE STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 38-39 (2011) [hereinafter PUPPET 
MASTERS], available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8894-5 (noting 
that the owners of a shelf corporation, a form of shell company, can be untraceable if ownership is 
never officially transferred by registering with the proper authorities); Richard K. Gordon, Trysts 
or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 
726-28, 735-36 (2008) (explaining that financial institutions use very rough “typologies” to 
determine which transactions present a higher risk of laundering, and that even when such 
transactions are identified, there is little guidance “to make clear how far a financial institution 
should go to identify clients”); J.W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the 
“Incorporation Transparency Act,” 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 857-58, 909-10 (2010) (recognizing the law 
enforcement problems posed by the lack of mandatory company ownership reporting, but noting 
that the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act is little more than “an 
empty gesture meant to generate the appearance of action”); Stefanie Ostfeld, Shell Game: Hidden 
Owners and Motives, CNN (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/26/opinion/ostfeld-shell-
companies/index.html (“The same loophole that allowed a donor to hide behind an anonymous shell 
company provides terrorists, corrupt foreign politicians and drug traffickers opportunity to 
squirrel dirty money into and through the U.S. financial system.”). 
18 See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 17, at 35 (describing shell companies as “hollow” be-
cause they are nonoperational as a corporate structure, although they can be used for legitimate 
legal purposes).  
19 Id. But see David Spencer, International Tax Evasion: Enablers and Shell Corporations (pt. 2), 
J. INT’L TAX’N, May 2007, at 36, 38 (noting that some companies “have used more sophisticated 
cross-border schemes and/or investment structures . . . which go beyond legitimate tax 
minimization arrangements”); Robert Paul Turner, The Death of the Shell Game, NEV. LAW., Jan. 
2002, at 7, 7 (noting a severe decline in the use of shell companies as fronts for mergers). 
20 See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 17, at ix (“Law enforcement and prosecution cannot go 
after stolen assets, confiscate and then return them if they are hidden behind the corporate veil.”); 
Dean Kalant, Who’s in Charge Here? Requiring More Transparency in Corporate America: Advance-
ments in Beneficial Ownership for Privately Held Companies, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1049, 1050 
(2009) (noting that “a person forming a corporation or LLC within the United States typically is 
required to ‘provide less information to the state of incorporation than is needed to obtain a bank account 
or driver’s license,’” resulting in an “extreme lack of ownership transparency in the United States”). 
21 See, e.g., U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case 
History: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Gov’t Affairs., 112th Cong. 2-3 (2012) (statement of David S. Cohen, Undersecretary for Terrorism 
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transparency as a way to avoid corruption and obstruct terrorist financing 
both within the United States and globally,22 but the effectiveness of these 
efforts is debatable, given terrorist organizations’ ability to adapt quickly.23 
While others have commented about how easy it is to form anonymous shell 
companies,24 no study thus far has determined how effective domestic and 
international regulations have been at curbing their proliferation and use.25  
 
and Fin. Intelligence, Dep’t of the Treasury) (providing case studies detailing the manner in which 
terrorist organizations have taken advantage of weaknesses in the U.S. financial system for illicit 
activities); WORLD BANK, COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF 
TERRORISM: A COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING GUIDE 13 (2009) (listing examples of businesses 
that are particularly vulnerable to terrorist financing).  
22 See, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (2012) (imposing mandatory record-
keeping requirements on financial institutions with penalties for noncompliance); Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (imposing 
criminal penalties for money laundering); Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention 
Implementation Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2006) (making the financing of terrorism a 
punishable federal offense); International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006) (criminalizing the acts of financing terrorism, 
increasing scrutiny of transactions with foreign shell companies, and adopting other measures to 
prevent money laundering); Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, 31 
U.S.C §§ 5340–5355 (2006) (designating high-risk areas for money laundering and related 
financial crimes); International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 
(2006 & Supp. V 2012) (providing executive power to intervene in foreign conflicts using financial 
means); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6101, 
118 Stat. 33638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (authorizing expenditures 
for technology to prevent financial crimes and terrorism in the United States); Money Laundering 
Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.); Annunzio–Wylie Anti–Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-550, tit. XV, 106 Stat. 4044 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.) 
(authorizing the revocation of various privileges of financial institutions convicted of money 
laundering). For commentary on interagency coordination to curb terrorist financing, see generally 
WEISS, supra note 15.  
23 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 169 (“The plotters’ tradecraft was not 
especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They moved, stored, and spent their money in 
ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time.”); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-163, TERRORIST FINANCING: U.S. AGENCIES SHOULD 
SYSTEMATICALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS’ USE OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS 
9 (2003) (“To move assets, terrorists use mechanisms that enable them to conceal or launder their 
assets through nontransparent trade or financial transactions such as charities, informal banking 
systems, bulk cash, and commodities such as precious stones and metals.”); Jacobson & Levitt, 
supra note 15, at 13 (“Due to the increased international scrutiny, Al-Qaeda has also become far 
more security conscious in its fundraising activities.”).  
24 See generally J.C. SHARMAN, THE MONEY LAUNDRY: REGULATING CRIMINAL FI-
NANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011); PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 17 (detailing the 
relative ease with which illicit activity can be conducted using legitimate corporate forms); Chana 
Joffe-Walt, Morning Edition: We Set Up an Offshore Company in a Tax Haven (NPR radio broadcast 
July 27, 2012, 5:00 AM), available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/07/27/157421340/how-
to-set-up-an-offshore-company (discussing businesses that inexpensively set up secret offshore 
companies for their clients); Kevin McCoy, Project Shows Ease of Money Laundering in USA, USA 
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This Article and the experiment we developed seek to fill this void and 
measure the effectiveness of domestic and international law at curbing the 
use of shell companies. Because the United States spends billions of dollars 
each year on counterterrorism, understanding the effectiveness of these 
efforts is crucial.26 Measuring their effectiveness is increasingly difficult, and 
much of the rhetoric concerning successful U.S. intervention into the 
terrorism-financing network is simply political.27 Policymakers often offer 
“perceptions of success” without providing data or even explaining their 
methodology. 28  This Article seeks to move the discussion forward by 
delivering extensive empirical data on the effectiveness of worldwide efforts 
to curb terrorist financing.  
The Article is divided into three parts. Part I outlines the current finan-
cial tools at terrorists’ disposal. It pays particular attention to anonymous 
shell companies and discusses the laws intended to stop the formation of 
such companies, their shortcomings, and other countervailing domestic 
policies and case law that foster their use. It then discusses the steps taken 
by the United States and the international community after 9/11 to reduce 
the threat of terrorism.  
 
TODAY (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2007-03-19-money-launder-
usat_N.htm (describing a project in which retired IRS agents very easily set up secretive companies 
and transferred money between them). 
25 While this Article takes a more empirical approach, the Council on Foreign Relations’ 
Independent Task Force provides a policy critique of the United States’ post-9/11 efforts in this 
area. See generally CFR, TERRORIST FINANCING, supra note 3.  
26 For differing perspectives on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to fight terrorism through 
financial regulation, see AVI JORISCH, TAINTED MONEY: ARE WE LOSING THE WAR ON MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING? 131-36 (2009); PERL, supra note 15; PAUL ROGERS, 
WHY WE’RE LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 146-49 (2008); Jacobson & Levitt, Op-Ed., Staying 
Solvent: Assessing Al-Qaeda’s Financial Portfolio, WASH. INST., Nov. 2009, at 9, 12, available at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4b28f9a9e2216.pdf; Ahmed Rashid, 
Losing the War on Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2006, at A17; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing David S. Cohen Remarks to the ABA/ABA 
Money Laundering Enforcement Conference (Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg317.aspx.  
27 See Sue E. Eckert & Thomas J. Biersteker, (Mis)Measuring Success in Countering the Financing 
of Terrorism (describing the political utility of countering the financing of terrorism, and crediting 
that utility with politicizing the numbers and rhetoric surrounding terrorist financing), in SEX, 
DRUGS, AND BODY COUNTS: THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS IN GLOBAL CRIME AND 
CONFLICT 247, 247-49 (Peter Andreas & Kelly M. Greenhill eds., 2010). Eckert and Biersteker 
note that while “there are no definitive metrics by which success or effectiveness can be assessed” 
in this domain, there is still “a variety of information and indicators that can help paint an overall 
picture.” Id. at 260. They also argue that effectiveness can be difficult to measure because much of 
the valuable information and data is classified. Id. at 258.  
28 See id. at 256 (critiquing the Bush Administration for failing to explain its metrics for 
claiming counterterrorism success).  
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Part II describes and analyzes the results from our experiment, in which 
we posed as customers from around the globe seeking to form anonymous 
shell companies.29 During the course of our study, we sent more than 7400 
requests to service providers worldwide asking for their assistance in 
forming anonymous shell companies. In some requests, we included obvious 
indicators of terrorism risk. In others, we tested whether knowledge of 
international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and 
the IRS would impact the number of offers we received. Overall, as described 
below, the results were disconcerting. In particular, knowledge of interna-
tional law proved much less of a deterrent to forming shell companies than 
one might hope. Indeed, our results suggest that these financial regulations 
may not be effective constraints on funding terrorism. 
Part III uses these results to answer some important questions. For instance, 
are certain countries or blocs of countries more likely to form fronts for 
terrorism? Do offshore states (i.e., tax havens) allow anonymous companies 
to form more easily? Are poor countries more likely than rich countries to 
facilitate terrorism financing? Is domestic or international law a more 
successful deterrent to the formation of shell companies in the United 
States? This Article concludes with some important lessons that can help 
U.S. regulators and the international community undermine financial 
support for terrorists and mitigate the threat of future terrorism.  
I. THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL WAR ON TERROR 
In the days following the September 11 attacks, the United States took 
immediate steps to secure its borders, engage its military, and expand the 
scope of its intelligence efforts. 30  As previously noted, some analysts 
estimate that fighting the War on Terror has cost the United States more 
than $3 trillion.31 Though the United States’ response to the attacks is not 
 
29 The full experiment is discussed in MICHAEL G. FINDLEY, DANIEL L. NIELSON, & 
J.C. SHARMAN, GLOBAL SHELL GAMES: EXPERIMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, 
CRIME, AND TERRORISM (2014). On the need for experiments in international law more generally, see 
Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments 52 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 173 (2014). 
30 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 330-38 (providing a detailed account of 
the days following and the United States’ military response to the September 11 attacks); Amy B. 
Zegart, September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies, INT’L SEC., Spring 
2005, at 78, 107-11 (describing the U.S. intelligence community’s responses and failures after 9/11).  
31 E.g., Shan Carter & Amanda Cox, One 9/11 Tally: $3.3 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html.  
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without its failings,32 its military and intelligence communities responded 
swiftly to disrupt terrorist activity at home and abroad.33 The United States 
has also taken steps “to target aggressively Islamic terrorism’s financial 
infrastructure.”34 These efforts spanned the globe, as the United States 
reached out to other nations and organizations to assist in achieving its goal 
of preventing terrorism financing in domestic and world markets.35 But as 
the United States worked to dismantle terrorist financing networks, terror-
ists adapted. To preserve their cash flow, they have resorted to more clan-
destine sources of funding.36 Because the United States has been slow to 
respond, it has been criticized as “lack[ing] the same creativity and innova-
tion that al-Qaeda financiers use each day in their planning.”37 
This Part examines the “creative” tools that terrorists use to finance their 
operations, focusing on shell companies. It then summarizes domestic and 
international responses to the threat of terrorist financing, and compares 
U.S. efforts with those of the international community. Finally, it parses out 
the shortcomings of those policies and describes how domestic policies 
might actually be promoting and furthering the use of shell companies as a 
front for terrorism and other illicit activities.  
 
32 See John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response 
to September 11, INT’L SEC., Summer 2012, at 81, 95-107 (describing how disproportionate and 
costly America’s response has been to al-Qaeda compared to the actual threat that al-Qaeda poses).  
33 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMPLEMENTING 9/11 COMMISSION RECOM-
MENDATIONS: PROGRESS REPORT 2011, at 43 (2011) (detailing the Department of Homeland 
Security’s progress in implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, including the 
Commission’s recommendation to track and disrupt terrorist financing); Stewart M. Patrick, The Unsung 
Success After 9/11: Multilateral Cooperation, INTERNATIONALIST (Sept. 6, 2011), http://blogs.cfr.org/ 
patrick/2011/09/06/the-unsung-success-after-911-multilateral-cooperation (cataloging the unprecedented 
international collaboration that followed 9/11); Ten Years After: The FBI Since 9/11, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9-11/response-and-recovery (detailing the FBI’s 
response in the aftermath of 9/11) (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). See generally Jena Baker McNeill et al., 39 
Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: Examining Counterterrorism’s Success Stories, BACKGROUNDER 
(Heritage Found., Phila., Pa.), May 20, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2011/05/39-terror-plots-foiled-since-911-examining-counterterrorisms-success-stories. 
34 CFR, TERRORIST FINANCING, supra note 3, at 12. The Council on Foreign Relations 
identified three tactical decisions taken by the Bush Administration after September 11, including 
increased intelligence activities, law enforcement coordination, and “public designations under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) [to block certain] persons, businesses, 
and financial institutions” from furthering terrorism. Id. The Council also identified strategic 
initiatives adopted by the Bush Administration and Congress, such as legislation like “sweeping 
new anti–money laundering laws” and the PATRIOT Act, as well as multilateral initiatives 
involving the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the 
FATF. Id. at 13-14.  
35 Id. at 13.  
36 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
37 CFR, TERRORIST FINANCING, supra note 3, at 32.  
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A. Financial Tools at Terrorists’ Disposal 
Terrorists use a variety of financial tools to fund their activities, including 
money laundering, charities, trusts, and, most notably, shell companies.  
1. Money Laundering 
Terrorists rely on money laundering to avoid detection.38 Money laun-
dering is a multi-layered process by which terrorists hide the illegal source 
or use of income and then “disguise[] that income to make it appear legiti-
mate.”39 It is estimated that between $590 billion and $1.5 trillion is laun-
dered annually worldwide, and some of that money is used to fund terrorist 
organizations.40 Money laundering happens in three basic stages: placement, 
layering, and integration.41 During the placement stage, money obtained 
from illegal practices is deposited into a financial institution.42 The layering 
stage occurs when the money is “pass[ed] . . . through many institutions 
and jurisdictions,” which aids in covering up the illegal source of the 
funds.43 Shell companies are important to this stage of the process because 
the layering transactions involve moving funds to supposedly legitimate 
companies.44 Finally, during the integration stage, money is put back into 
the economy “through normal financial or commercial operations” in a way 
that makes it appear legitimate.45 Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS), 
which are used heavily in the Middle East and Asia, are of particular concern 
 
38 See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora & Brian J. Field, Using and Abusing the Financial Markets: Money 
Laundering as the Achilles’ Heel of Terrorism, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 59, 59-61 (2007) (arguing that 
undermining the ability of financiers of terrorism to launder money is critical to combating 
terrorists). Terrorists finance their activities through a variety of illegal activities, including 
“extortion, kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and fraud,” but the money from those 
activities often needs to be laundered before it can move into terrorists’ hands. Terrorism: Growing 
Wahhabi Influence in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland 
Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 68 (2003) (statement of David D. Aufhauser, Gen. 
Counsel, Dep’t of the Treasury).  
39 Lisa A. Barbot, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 162, 162 (1994); see also Alison S. Bachus, Note, From Drugs to Terrorism: The Focus Shifts in the 
International Fight Against Money Laundering After September 11, 2001, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 835, 835 (2004).  
40 What Is Money Laundering?, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/faq/moneylaundering 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2014); see also The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism, IMF (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm.  
41 Peter Reuter & Edwin M. Truman, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST 
MONEY LAUNDERING 3 (2004). 
42 Id. at 25. 
43 Id. at 3. 
44 Id. at 30-31. 
45 Id. at 3, 25. 
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in the fight against financing terrorism through money laundering.46 These 
nonconventional banking systems, in which money is transferred using a 
network of intermediaries, pose a real danger because transfers of illegiti-
mate funds are anonymous and ubiquitous.47 Though IVTS are used widely 
for legitimate transactions, they remain particularly prone to abuse.48  
Since 9/11, the fight against financing terrorism has focused on money 
laundering, 49  yet many challenges remain for law enforcement. First, 
terrorists can launder money through a multitude of channels, including 
currency exchanges, stockbrokers, casinos, automobile dealerships, insurance 
trading companies, gems and precious metals, Internet banking, trusts, wire 
transfers, ATMs, mortgages, and brokerage accounts.50 Needless to say, the sheer 
variety of methods to launder money complicates the efforts of law enforcement.  
Second, laundering techniques are complex and well financed. Traffickers 
constantly employ the latest technologies to keep “one step ahead of law 
enforcement” efforts.51 And third, the laws of various nations lack the 
consistency needed to stop money laundering. Although most nations have 
enacted anti–money laundering laws, some are stronger than others.52 As a 
result, money launderers conduct business in the countries with the weakest 
laws.53 Indeed, the international money laundering effort “is only as strong 
as its weakest link.”54 
 
46 See Walter Perkel, Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer Systems, 41 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 183, 183-85 (2004) (describing the three major worldwide IVTS and their use in 
financing terrorism); Tad Edward Thompson, The War on Terror(ist Financing), 14 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 101, 103-04 (2010). 
47 Advisory, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the Treas., Informal Value Transfer Sys-
tems (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2010-A011.pdf.  
48 See Perkel, supra note 46, at 183-85 (noting that though “the vast majority of money trans-
ferred via the IVTS is clean money,” they are also used extensively to finance terrorism and 
“[o]ther transnational criminal activity”); Thompson, supra note 46, at 103-04 (highlighting the 
enforcement challenges posed by IVTS, given their utility for both legitimate and nefarious purposes). 
49 Jackie Johnson, 11th September, 2001: Will It Make a Difference to the Global Anti–Money 
Laundering Movement?, J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, Summer 2002, at 9, 10-11 (detailing 
U.S. efforts to combat money laundering in the immediate aftermath of 9/11). 
50 See 2 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS (INL), 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes XII-1, XII-4 [hereinafter 2 INL, 
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/8703.pdf, in INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 
(2002); Bruce Zagaris & Scott Ehlers, Drug Trafficking & Money Laundering, FOREIGN POL’Y IN 
FOCUS (Oct. 6, 2005), http://fpif.org/drug_trafficking_money_laundering (describing the third 
stage of money laundering in which “a legitimate explanation for the fund is created”).  
51 Bachus, supra note 39, at 846.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 846-47; see also INL, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes 34-55, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204280.pdf (discussing “Major Money Laundering 
Countries” and listing “Jurisdictions of Primary Concern” that are particularly vulnerable to 
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2. Charities and Trusts 
Though terrorists frequently launder money through financial markets 
and other expected channels, terrorism is also heavily financed through 
legitimate means, such as charities and trusts.55 Because of the generally 
unregulated nature of these funds, terrorists’ exploitation of charitable and 
nonprofit resources presents one of the most “serious challenges” for law 
enforcement.56 Terrorist organizations often exploit the principle of zakat, 
or charity—one of the five pillars of Islam.57 Charities elicit funding from a 
variety of sources, including “membership subscriptions, donations, sales of 
publications, . . . and appeals to wealthy members of the community.”58  
Another challenge for law enforcement—particularly in the United 
States—is that the freedoms of speech, association, and religion may stymie 
government intervention to stop the funding of terrorism through charitable 
and nonprofit foundations. 59  Terrorist groups have enjoyed particular 
success since the Cold War, funding their operations through such organiza-
tions by appealing to religious and social commonalities.60  They have 
 
money laundering “because of weak or nonexistent supervisory or enforcement regimes or weak 
political will”), in INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (2013).  
54  FATF, GLOBAL MONEY LAUNDERING & TERRORIST FINANCING THREAT AS-
SESSMENT 50 (2010), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Global% 
20Threat%20assessment.pdf. 
55 See Anna Gardella, The Fight Against the Financing of Terrorism Between Judicial and Regula-
tory Regulation, 6 STUD. INT’L FIN. ECON. & TECH. L. 109, 111 (2003); see also Daryl Shetterly, 
Note, Starving the Terrorists of Funding: How the United States Treasury is Fighting the War on Terror, 
18 REGENT U. L. REV. 327, 329 (2006) (“[U]nlike money laundering, terrorist financing often 
originates with legitimate organizations and travels through customary channels. While money 
laundering ‘depends on the existence of an underlying crime, terrorist financing does not.’ It is 
often difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether funds are destined for a terrorist organiza-
tion until they are actually delivered.” (footnote omitted)). 
56 Gardella, supra note 55, at 115-16; see also Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism 
and Anti–Money Laundering Regimes, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 45, 51-52 (2002) (providing 
examples of charities with ties to the Middle East and Central Asia used to fund al-Qaeda). 
57 Ilias Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 315, 322 
(2003) (“The source of zakat is the Qur’an itself, the primary source of legal and religious 
reference in Islamic law. The Qur’an sets out five lawful recipients of zakat. Of particular interest 
are those described as sabil Allah, which refers to persons engaging in deeds for the common good 
of a particular Muslim society. Terrorist groups have construed sabil Allah to encompass violence 
against non-Muslim Western targets.”). 
58 Gardella, supra note 55, at 114.  
59 See Kathryn A. Ruff, Note, Scared to Donate: An Examination of the Effects of Designating 
Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the First Amendment Rights of Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 477-82 (2005) (explaining the effect of First Amendment freedoms 
on combating terrorism).  
60 Bantekas, supra note 57, at 321-22. 
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infiltrated established charities to hide their funding.61 Such “funds have 
been used to recruit terrorists, fund administrative activities of the organiza-
tions and support families of killed, arrested, or injured terrorists.” 62 
Unfortunately, many of these charitable organizations have been unaware 
that their funds were being used to support terrorism.63  
In addition to charities, terrorists move money through trusts in order to 
take advantage of privacy laws that conceal trust formation data.64  For 
example, “blind trusts” can be set up without reference to the beneficiaries or 
purpose of the trust.65 Also, some jurisdictions allow for “flee clauses,” 
which “provide for the automatic transfer of the trust to another jurisdiction 
if the trust becomes the subject of any sort of enquiry.”66 The anonymity 
and privacy afforded by trusts are attractive qualities, since the true or 
“beneficial” owners, as well as the recipients of the funds (including terror-
ist organizations), can be hidden beneath layers of corporate identities.67 
The U.N. Security Council has implicated Islamic trusts in a variety of terrorist 
acts, including the 2008 bombings in India and arms dealing in Afghanistan.68  
 
61 See Victor Comras, Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups (noting that since 
September 11, the U.N. al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee has identified about two dozen 
charities as shells for terrorist funding, though they are thought to be “only the tip of the 
iceberg”), in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE 115, 130-32 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007). 
62 Rebecca Gregory, The Lawyer’s Role: Will Uncle Sam Want You in the Fight Against Money 
Laundering and Terrorism?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 23, 45 (2003); see also U.K. CHARITY COMM’N, How 
Might a Charity Be Abused for Terrorist Purposes?, PROTECTING CHARITIES FROM HARM: COMPLIANCE 
TOOLKIT, ch. 1, module 3, at 3 (2012), available at http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/media/90832/ 
tkch1mod3.pdf (noting that charity assets can “be used to transport people, cash, weapons or 
terrorist propaganda”). 
63 See Anne L. Clunan, The Fight Against Terrorist Financing, 121 POL. SCI. Q. 569, 570 (2006) 
(“Charities raising funds for humanitarian relief in war-torn societies may or may not know that 
their funds are going to terrorism. Corrupt individuals at charities or at recipient organizations 
may divert funds to terrorist organizations. This appears to be one of the main means through 
which al Qaeda raises funds.”). 
64 See Bantekas, supra note 57, at 323 (noting that in most jurisdictions, “strict privacy 
rules . . . help conceal the identity of the various parties . . . behind the trust,” and noting further 
that trusts “can evidently be used by terrorists to launder illegal money and also to circulate funds 
without danger of being detected by channeling them through financial institutions”).  
65 Id. 
66 FATF, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 2000–2001, at 19-20 (2001), 
available at http://www.cbr.ru/today/anti_legalisation/fatf/typ-00-01.pdf; Bantekas, supra note 57, at 323. 
67 PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 17, at 20-23. 
68 See, e.g., Nature of the Threat of Terrorist Abuse and Exploitation of Non-Profit Organizations 
(NPOs), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (U.S. Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan), 2012, available at 
http://kabul.usembassy.gov/media/doc0.pdf (implicating “the charitable arm of Lashkar-e-Tayba” 
in the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury 
Identifies New Aliases of Al Rashid and Al-Akhtar Trusts Pakistan-Based Trusts Previously 
Designated for Supporting al Qaida (Jul. 2, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ 
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3. Shell Companies 
Finally, terrorists use shell companies to conceal and transfer money 
through bank accounts around the globe, including transfers within the 
United States.69 Like trusts, shell companies possess an important quality: 
identity protection.70 They obscure true beneficial ownership to the detri-
ment of law enforcement worldwide.71 In fact, as the United States has 
pushed heavily to prevent money laundering and illegal money transfers, 
the use of shell companies has increased.72  
A shell company is a business entity with no significant assets or ongo-
ing business activities, which is capable of transferring large sums of money 
worldwide.73 “Shell companies . . . typically have no physical presence 
other than a mailing address, employ no one, and produce little to no 
independent economic value.”74 They are also easily formed, and many 
states do not require ownership disclosure.75 They are often formed “to 
conduct legitimate transactions, such as domestic and cross-border currency 
and asset transfers, or to facilitate corporate mergers and reorganizations.”76 
 
press-releases/Pages/hp1065.aspx (identifying aliases of trusts “associated with Usama bin Laden, 
al Qaida or the Taliban”). 
69 See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 17, at 37 (explaining how shell companies “[c]onceal 
[o]wnership of [b]ank [a]ccounts”). 
70 See Verret, supra note 17, at 890-92 (noting the difficulty of assessing the identity of the 
owner of a shell company). 
71 See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 17, at 35-36 (noting that shell companies’ lack of “eco-
nomic activity” can “make[] it difficult to find out much information about them”); Comras, supra 
note 61, at 124 (explaining the difficulty of regulating shell companies when they “protect [al 
Qaeda’s financial facilitators’] identity and the identity of other financial contributors”); Chizu 
Nakajima, Politics: Offshore Centres, Transparency and Integrity: The Case of the UK Territories (“The 
lack of an official registry or strict banking secrecy laws makes identification of the beneficial 
owners of legal entities very difficult.”), in GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRIME: TERRORISM, MONEY 
LAUNDERING, AND OFFSHORE CENTRES 219, 239 (Donato Masciandaro ed., 2004); Verret, 
supra note 17, at 891 (“Law enforcement personnel assert that the use of corporate shell companies 
hampers their ability to investigate corporate suspects.”).  
72 See They Sell Sea Shells, supra note 16, at 2 (“One reason for [shell companies’] ubiquity is 
an American-led push against money laundering. . . . [S]hell companies have become the easiest 
way for a malefactor to hide his identity.”). 
73 See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 16, at 2 (stating that shell 
companies “allow[] for the movement of billions of dollars internationally by unknown beneficial 
owners”); Krzysztof Woda, The Analysis of Money Laundering Techniques (naming shell corporations 
as a primary method of transferring large sums of money), in CYBER WARFARE AND CYBER 
TERRORISM 138, 141 (Lech J. Janczewski & Andrew M. Colarik eds., 2008); see also PUPPET 
MASTERS, supra note 17, at 34 (defining a shell company as a “non-operational company—that is, a legal 
entity that has no independent operations, significant assets, ongoing business activities, or employees”). 
74 FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 16, at 4. 
75 Id. at 2-3. 
76 Id. at 4.  
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In fact, their use is vital to the operation of many businesses and to the econo-
mies of many nations. For example, shell companies in the Netherlands engage 
“in an estimated $1 trillion in transactions each year,” and the taxes these 
companies pay are an important source of revenue for the government.77  
Shell companies are so popular that an incorporation services industry 
has developed worldwide to cater to desiring clients. One of the most 
attractive characteristics of shell companies is that they protect their owners’ 
privacy. For instance, a Wyoming business-incorporation specialist’s website 
advertised that “[a] corporation is a legal person created by state statute that 
can be used as a fall guy, a servant, a good friend, or a decoy. . . . A 
person you control . . . yet [you] cannot be held accountable for its actions. 
Imagine the possibilities!”78 Another such “incorporation agent” in London 
“promotes Delaware . . . as ‘an offshore tax haven for non-U.S. residents’” 
and notes the advantages of shell companies, including that “‘[o]wners’ 
names are not disclosed to the state,’ and ‘the company is not required to 
report any assets.’”79 Another website advertises that for under seventy 
dollars, it can create a corporation in Nevada that “may provide for anony-
mous ownership and bearer shares.”80  
In 2009, more than two million shell companies were formed in the 
United States alone.81 Terrorists, in particular, view shell companies as an 
attractive medium to move money anonymously around the world.82 They can 
be used as a “back door to the U.S. financial system,” and allow terrorists—and 
 
77 Gregory Crouch, Shaken Trust: The Netherlands Rethinks an Offshore Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2004, at C1. Shell companies are also an important source of revenue for various states within the United 
States, which makes identity-reporting requirements particularly unattractive to state governments. See 
Dennis Lormel, Shell Companies . . . Facilitation Tool for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 
COUNTERTERRORISM BLOG (Apr. 23, 2007, 12:16 PM), http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/04 
(concluding that, before Congress can create uniform regulation of shell companies, it “must 
address the likely adverse impact any regulation would have on state revenues, resources and 
budgetary demands”).  
78 Kelly Carr & Brian Grow, Special Report: A Little House of Secrets on the Great Plains, 
REUTERS (June 28, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/us-usa-shell-companies-
idUSTRE75R20Z20110628 (citation omitted). 
79 Elizabeth MacDonald, Shell Games, FORBES, Feb. 12, 2007, at 96, 99. 
80 Id. The site also promoted “shelf” corporations, which are dormant incorporated business-
es with a past operating history. Id. 
81 Lynnley Browning, Delaware Laws, Helpful to Arms Trafficker, to Be Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/business/05tax.html?scp=1&sq=Delaware% 
20Laws,%20Helpful%20to%20Arms%20Trafficker,%20to%20Be%20Scrutinized&st=cse. 
82 Tom Herman, Tax Report: IRS Cracks Down on Dodgers Who Use Onshore Tax Havens, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2006, at D2. 
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their financial supporters—to evade sanctions.83  Indeed, many terrorist 
groups have used shell companies to launder and obscure their ties to illegal 
funds.84 Terrorist organizations can further “distance themselves from the 
actual formation of specific shell companies by using company formation 
agents”85 or by appointing puppet nominees to leadership positions of the 
company to allow the true owners to hide their identities.86 Indeed, one 
expert opined “that of all the organisations employing money-laundering 
techniques, terrorist organisations are probably the most trained and adept 
at disguising their own origins as well as those of their funds.”87  
After the events of 9/11, however, shell companies and lax financial re-
porting laws faced increased scrutiny, particularly at the state level. Senator 
Carl Levin of Michigan, a principal proponent of reforms in this area, 
argued that “[w]ithin our own borders, the laws of some states regarding the 
formation of legal entities have significant transparency gaps which may 
even rival the secrecy afforded in the most attractive tax havens.”88 Due to these 
regulatory gaps, the Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
received 1002 Suspicious Activity Reports between 1996 and 2005 identifying 
suspicious financial “activity that appear[ed] to be related to shell companies.”89 
Of these reports, 768 involved suspicious international wire transfers.90  
There is no simple mechanism, however, to detect and eliminate shell 
companies. State officials contend that it would be too costly to investigate 
all the private companies seeking to incorporate, and that disclosing the 
 
83 See Glenn R. Simpson, ABN Amro to Pay $80 Million Fine Over Iran, Libya, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 20, 2005, at A3 (describing the Treasury Department’s critical view of shell companies, 
especially following 9/11). 
84 See MacDonald, supra note 79, at 96 (noting how individuals associated with al-Qaeda have 
used shell companies in Utah and California “to commit bank fraud and money laundering and 
possibly to fund terrorist activities in the Middle East”); see also Glenn R. Simpson, Palestinian 
Bank Faces U.S. Probe on Laundering, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2005, at B3 (describing a “major 
crackdown” on the use of shell companies to fund terrorism).  
85 JEROME P. BJELOPERA & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41547, 
ORGANIZED CRIME: AN EVOLVING CHALLENGE FOR U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 15 (2010).  
86 See Carr & Grow, supra note 78 (revealing that some states “allow the real owners of corpo-
rations to hide behind ‘nominee’ officers and directors with no direct role in the business”). 
87 Martin S. Navias, Finance Warfare as a Response to International Terrorism, 73 POL. Q. 57, 66 
(Issue Supp. s1 2002). 
88 155 CONG. REC. 6922 (2009) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
89 FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 16, at 11.  
90 Id. Osama bin Laden used “his experience of money transfer techniques”—his “main area 
of technical specialisation”—to aid al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks. Navias, supra note 87, at 61. Saudi 
officials have determined that bin Laden used a network of more than fifty shell companies 
worldwide to launder money. Glenn R. Simpson, Letter Suggests Saudis Supported Citizen’s Censure, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2002, at A4. 
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names of shareholders would violate employers’ privacy.91 The fact that shell 
company assets often come from legitimate sources makes it difficult for law 
enforcement, because, in the past, most funds used to support illegal 
activities were obtained illicitly.92 Terrorists’ expert ability to move and 
conceal funds further complicates attempts at detection.93 Although the 
complex nature of transactions involving shell companies makes detection 
difficult, some critics argue that it is not as difficult as it seems. Richard K. 
Gordon, a former specialist in money laundering and terrorist financing at 
the IMF, contends, “It’s not like we’re infiltrating the Mafia, where it takes 
five years to get insiders.”94 
Terrorist groups understand the truth of the saying that “dirty money is 
best passed through clean hands.”95 They abuse legal entities that can be 
used for legitimate purposes, such as charities, trusts, and shell companies, 
and the lax regulatory schemes that govern them, to evade detection by law 
enforcement and circulate millions of dollars around the world. Lawmakers and 
law enforcement officials face the challenge of balancing the interests of many 
legitimate users of shell companies with the need to cut off terrorists’ funding.  
B. Defunding Terrorism: Domestic Efforts 
This Section describes domestic efforts to combat terrorism since Sep-
tember 11 across all branches of the federal government and various sectors 
of the U.S. economy. 
 
91 See Marcia Coyle, Feds Want More Corporate Data, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 11, 2010, at 1 (“State 
treasurers . . . contend [that additional disclosure requirements] would federalize state 
incorporation practices and impose costly and onerous administrative burdens on the states and 
small business.”). But cf. Zulima V. Farber & Khizar A. Sheikh, Employers and Homeland Security: 
The United States’ Strategy for Combating Terrorism and Its Direct Impact on Employers, N.J. LAW. 
MAG., Oct. 2007, at 44, 48-49 (discussing the legislative changes regarding governmental access to 
information and noting that “the government has acted to assist employers . . . by issuing 
guidance that includes how to protect employee rights”).  
92 See Navias, supra note 87, at 68 (discussing the unique sources of funding for terrorist 
organizations that differentiate them from other criminal organizations and explaining that “where 
sources of funding are legal there may be few if any indicators that would identify any individual 
financial transaction . . . as being linked to terrorist operations”). 
93 See Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda’s Finances Ample, Say Probers, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2003, at 
A1 (“[Terrorist financiers] are men of resources, men of high finance who know how to reformulate 
their businesses and how to move money.”).  
94 Jerry Markon, Muslim Anger Still Burns Over Probe of Charities, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 
2006, at B1. 
95 Barbot, supra note 39, at 162. 
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1. U.S. Military, Security, and Intelligence Efforts 
As described above, the United States has spent an unprecedented 
amount of money on its military, security, and intelligence efforts to combat 
terrorism.96 Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)97 
and its companion agencies, such as the Transportation Security Admin-
istration (TSA),98 have brought together law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies to combat terrorism. DHS’s broad mandate is, in part, to “(A) 
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) reduce the vulnera-
bility of the United States to terrorism; [and] (C) minimize the damage, 
and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the 
United States.”99 
The United States’ efforts also reached outside the country, and the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) quickly 
evolved to deal with both emerging domestic and international threats. 
Specifically, the DOD shifted its focus to preventing acts of terror and 
increased its domestic involvement in the incapacitation of potential 
terrorists.100 Additionally, instead of taking military action only “against 
state sponsors of terrorism,” the DOD exercised military force in countries 
 
96 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. 
97 The DHS was organized merely eleven days after the September 11 attacks, with former 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as its first director. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2014). It brought together more than twenty-two government organizations 
that were responsible for different aspects of security in the United States. Id.; see also PRESI-
DENT GEORGE W. BUSH, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2002), available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf (advocating for the creation of the DHS by noting 
that more than 100 agencies shared security responsibilities).  
98 DHS now controls a host of functions within subagencies, including TSA, which was 
created in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to oversee all transportation-related security activities, 
with a particular focus on airport security. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 49 
U.S.C. § 114 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (creating the TSA and specifying its duties and powers). 
99 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1) (2012). With this broad-reaching authority, many fear that the DHS 
wields too much power. See, e.g., Jonathan Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 513, 525 (2003) (“Narrowing DHS’s focus to prevention—through border security, 
information analysis, and infrastructure protection—would improve homeland security without 
compromising essential emergency tasks.”); Paul C. Light & James M. Lindsay, Op-Ed., 
Homeland Security: Calibrating Calamity, WASH. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at A19 (“Military force and 
diplomacy both contribute to national security, yet no one argues for placing them in the same agency.”). 
Many were particularly concerned that the President was given full appointment power over five of the 
twenty-seven upper-level DHS officials. See Thessin, supra, at 529-30 (describing criticisms that the 
Homeland Security Act’s appointment provisions “impinge[] upon congressional prerogatives”). 
100 See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of 
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21-24 (2005) (arguing that the DOD played a limited, 
traditional military role in counter-terrorism efforts before 9/11, but it has played a preventative 
and increasingly domestic role since). 
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that harbored terrorists within their borders.101 The DOD has also detained 
and interrogated terrorists within the United States—a practice that has 
been particularly controversial and has caused “institutional competition” 
between the DOD and the DOJ.102  
The DOJ similarly expanded its authority by relying on the “federal 
material witness statute”103 to detain suspected terrorists who could not 
otherwise be held.104 The DOJ also detained individuals based on a statute 
that criminalizes the provision of any “material support” to terrorists.105 
These material support statutes quickly formed the foundation of the U.S. 
government’s war on terror and provided the “weapon of choice” for 
prosecuting terrorism domestically.106 These statutes have become central to 
the United States’ efforts to obstruct terrorist financing. 
Lawmakers also strengthened the ability of U.S. intelligence agencies to 
gather intelligence both domestically and internationally. Three important 
 
101 See id. at 22-23 (explaining how the U.S. military departed from its traditional role of 
“act[ing] against state sponsors of terrorism” by, for example, detaining “an indeterminate number of 
suspected terrorists” outside of traditionally defined combat zones). 
102 Id. at 25. Military involvement in the detention of people within the United States has 
been controversial. One noteworthy case involved Jose Padilla, a detainee who was an American 
citizen. See id. Although many thought that Padilla, which reached the Supreme Court twice, 
would resolve the major issues related to the military detention of potential terrorists within U.S. 
borders, the Supreme Court did not address those questions. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 
1063 (2006) (deciding to withhold judgment on the substantive detention issues until “the 
necessity arises”); Chesney supra note 100, at 25. 
103 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
104 See Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of “Hold Until Cleared”: Reexamining Material 
Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 682-83 (2005) 
(describing how the material witness statute allowed the DOJ to detain individuals who had not 
violated the law but were “needed as a witness in some criminal proceeding”). After 9/11, the DOJ 
was determined to use “every available law enforcement tool” to prevent another terrorist attack. 
Id. at 682. Previously unenforced immigration violations became the justification for numerous 
arrests. Id. To detain American citizens, the DOJ began to rely on the federal material witness 
statute. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3144; Viet D. Dinh, Foreword, Freedom and Security After September 
11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 401-02 (2002) (describing the DOJ’s use of material witness 
warrants to prevent terrorist attacks by incapacitating potential terrorists through detention). 
105 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339B (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2006) is also a 
material support statute, but it is rarely used. These provisions were originally passed in 1996, 
though they were seldom used until after 9/11. See Chesney, supra note 100, at 18-19 
(“[N]otwithstanding the effort it took to establish [18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339B], these powers 
resulted in very few prosecutions prior to 9/11. Section 2339A may have been used on as few as two 
occasions . . . one of which involved a domestic militia rather than a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion. Meanwhile, § 2339B was used on only four occasions . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 297, 298 (2008) 
(criticizing Congress for failing to “facilitate[e] the prosecution of major terrorists in civilian 
courts by enacting major legislative change,” instead “tak[ing only] incremental steps, . . . buil[ding] 
on the material support-based system that it put in place in the mid-1990’s”). 
106 Peterson, supra note 105, at 300-01. 
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developments made this happen: (1) Congress passed the PATRIOT Act to 
amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),107 (2) the 
National Security Agency (NSA) implemented the “Terrorist Surveillance 
Program,”108 and (3) Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).109 As a result of each of these efforts, 
intelligence officials can more easily prevent communication between 
terrorists,110 gather intelligence domestically and internationally,111 and centralize 
recommendations and directives to the President and his advisors.112 
 
107 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(k)(1), 1825(k)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (amending FISA to 
allow federal officers conducting surveillance for foreign intelligence information to consult and 
coordinate with federal law enforcement officers); id. § 1842(a)(1), (c)(2) (2006) (amending FISA 
to allow the use of “pen registers” and “tap and trace devices” against U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents); id. § 1861(a)(1) (2011) (expanding the FBI’s ability to apply for an order for 
production of “tangible things” in investigations); Viet D. Dinh & Wendy J. Keefer, FISA and the 
PATRIOT Act: A Look Back and a Look Forward, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xviii 
(2006) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2006) (repealed 2008), which allowed for surveillance of 
a person in varying areas and using different communications facilities on one order rather than 
requiring separate orders for each facility); id. at xvii-xviii (“Prior to September 11th, our foreign 
intelligence and law enforcement officers did not always have access to the most recent technology. 
Existing law had been drafted in a world where communications focused on land-line tele-
phones . . . . Several provisions of the PATRIOT Act seek to bring the law up to date with 
current technology.”).  
108 See David E. Sanger & John O’Neil, White House Begins New Effort to Defend Surveillance Pro-
gram, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/politics/23cnd-wiretap.html?_r=1 
(discussing President Bush’s announcement and defense of the NSA’s “warrantless eavesdropping 
program, calling it a ‘terrorist surveillance program’ that had saved lives”). This program drew 
heavy criticism. See, e.g., Katherine Wong, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 517, 528-34 (2006) (arguing that the terrorist surveillance program represents an unconsti-
tutional expansion of executive power); David Cole et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at 42, 42 (arguing that the terrorist surveillance program is illegal 
under existing law). In response, U.S. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales sent a letter to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee stating that “any electronic surveillance that was occurring as part of 
the Terrorist Surveillance Program will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court.” Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., to Chairman 
Patrick Leahy and Sen. Arlen Specter, S. Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 17, 2007), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20060117gonzales_Letter.pdf. 
109 See 150 CONG. REC. 25,942 (2004) (statement of Sen. Tom Udall) (discussing the antici-
pated impact of the IRTPA); Id. at 19,412 (statement of Sen. Susan Collins) (referring to the 
IRTPA as “the most sweeping reform of our intelligence structures in more than 50 years”). The 
IRTPA was passed in response to the 9/11 Commission’s findings regarding obstacles that might 
keep the United States from preventing future terrorist attacks. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 339-48 (discussing the failures of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and identifying 
four major areas for improvement: “imagination, policy, capabilities, and management”).  
110 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT ACT AT 
WORK 18-28 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/patriot_report_from_the_field0704.pdf 
(outlining ways the PATRIOT Act has improved the United States’ ability to intercept terrorist 
communications); Benjamin R. Davis, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating Terrorist Exploitation of the 
Internet with the Rule of Law and Improved Tools for Cyber Governance, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 
119, 150-55 (2006) (discussing changes to the government’s power, as a result of the PATRIOT Act 
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2. U.S. Financial Efforts 
The United States has also taken significant financial measures to com-
bat terrorism, although these actions are not as extensive as its military, 
security, and intelligence measures discussed above. In fact, the United 
States has come under heavy criticism for its lax regulatory scheme, numerous 
shell companies, and noncompliance with accepted international identity 
requirements.113 Senator Carl Levin has noted that shell companies are 
required to provide “less information to the State than is required to open a 
bank account or obtain a driver’s license.”114  
This is not to say that the United States has not taken any efforts to pre-
vent terrorism financing. For example, pursuant to an executive order, the 
Department of the Treasury deprives charities and trusts access to illicit 
funds by giving them “terrorist designations.”115 Further, to restrict the use 
of shell companies for terrorist financing, the United States has occasionally 
enforced the material support statutes.116 It has also worked to identify 
 
and the Homeland Security Act, to combat terrorists’ ability to use the internet to communicate 
and gain resources). 
111 Under FISA, the government is now only required to show that foreign intelligence is a 
“significant purpose” of surveillance, amending the previous requirement that such intelligence be 
“the purpose.” In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 728-29 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (discussing Congress’s 
amendment of 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006)); see also Dinh & Keefer, supra note 107, at xiv-
xvii (discussing how changing to the “significant purpose” test was not meant “wholly to tear down 
the division between law enforcement and foreign intelligence activities . . . [but to] open 
certain doors to prevent isolation both of investigators and the information they collect”). See 
generally John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 et seq.) Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of Foreign 
Powers and Their Agents, 190 A.L.R. Fed. 385 (2003). 
112 See, e.g., Conference Report on Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, 150 CONG. REC. 25,950 (statement of Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton) (“[Before 9/11, 
v]arious intelligence agencies each had parts of vital information about the imminence of an 
attack, but they rarely communicated and never collaborated.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 110, at 2-9 (describing how the PATRIOT Act allowed agencies to share information and 
“connect the dots”). 
113 See FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 299-303 tbl.1 (June 23, 2006) (evaluating 
the United States’ compliance with FATF recommendations); cf., e.g., Carr & Grow, supra note 78 
(showcasing Wyoming companies that offer incorporation services). 
114 155 CONG. REC. 6921 (2009) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
115 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: PROTECTING CHARITABLE GIVING 
(June 4, 2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/ 
Documents/Treasury%20Charity%20FAQs%206-4-2010%20FINAL.pdf. 
116 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. To prosecute under these statutes, the 
government must show that a “person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired 
to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include 
himself) to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, 
supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2006). 
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“foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs) and block their funding domesti-
cally and abroad.117  
The United States has made significant efforts to restrict certain transac-
tions and regulate money laundering generally through the PATRIOT Act 
and the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA).118 The PATRIOT Act, 
for instance, requires that broker–dealers file Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs) and that they take extra precautions when dealing with shell 
companies.119 Many of the PATRIOT Act’s reforms were accomplished by 
amending the Bank Secrecy Act.120 Financial institutions are also required 
 
For an overview of the requirements of the material support statutes, see generally Randolph N. 
Jonakait, A Double Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing Material Support or Resources to 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 125 (2003). For a critique of 
their use, see Peterson, supra note 105, at 349-53. See also Jeff Breinholt, Resolved, or Is It? The First 
Amendment and Giving Money to Terrorists, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1278-81 (2008) (discussing the 
role First Amendment protection plays in terrorist financing laws); Chesney, supra note 100, at 52-
55 (explaining First Amendment objections to anti–money laundering regulation).  
117 Section 216 of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Secretary of State to 
designate a group as an FTO if three findings are made: (1) that the group is a “foreign organization;” 
(2) that the group “engages in terrorist activity . . . or terrorism . . . or retains the capability 
and intent” to do so; and (3) that the group’s “terrorist activity or terrorism . . . threatens the 
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189 
(2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) (“[T]he term ‘terrorist organization’ means an organiza-
tion designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.”). The President can also influence the designation of groups as terrorist organizations under 
certain circumstances as detailed in IEEPA. See Chesney, supra note 100, at 18-21 (noting the 
increased use of IEEPA powers since 9/11). 
118 See Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation: Financial Institutions Face Challenges Complying 
With Anti–Money Laundering Laws, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 395, 396, 397 n.4 (2005) (mentioning 
the U.S. government’s increased powers to combat money laundering and terrorist financing under 
the PATRIOT Act, and noting that money laundering was first recognized as a crime in its own 
right by the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2006 & Supp. V 
2012)). For further details about the PATRIOT Act and its implementation, see Bruce Zagaris, 
supra note 56, at 56-68.  
119 Sorcher, supra note 118, at 399-400, 402-03. SARs must be filed when a transaction 
is conducted or attempted by, at, or through the broker–dealer, and the broker–
dealer knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that the transaction (or a pattern of 
transactions): (1) involves funds derived from illegal activity, or is intended or con-
ducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity; (2) is 
designed, whether through structuring or other means, to evade the requirements of 
the Bank Secrecy Act; (3) has no business or apparent lawful purpose, or is not the 
sort in which the particular customer would be expected to engage, and the broker–
dealer knows of no reasonable explanation after examining the available facts; or (4) 
uses the broker–dealer to facilitate criminal activity. 
Id. (citing Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 66 Fed. Reg. 67,670 (codified as 
amended at 31 C.F.R. § 103.18 (2001))). 
120 Enacted by Congress in 1970, and amended multiple times, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)  
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to do more to verify the identity of their customers through “Customer 
Identification Programs” (CIPs), due diligence, and cross-border infor-
mation sharing.121 The PATRIOT Act also better regulates IVTS,122 which, 
as discussed above, are utilized heavily in the Middle East and Asia to 
launder money through currency exchanges.123 The United States has also 
relied on the MLCA, enacted in 1998, to enforce reporting requirements 
and to regulate foreign money laundering through U.S. banking institutions.124 
 
is based on the assumption that it is easiest for law enforcement to detect and prosecute 
money laundering during the placement phase of the process, since the money is 
closest to its origin at that point in time, and the financial institutions used for 
placement can be regulated through mandatory reporting requirements. 
Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money Laundering: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral Policy Reforms, 23 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 263, 294-95 (2003) (citing Barbot, supra note 39). One of the BSA’s more relevant 
provisions requires domestic banking institutions to file a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) if 
“$10,000 or more is withdrawn or deposited into one account in a single day.” Id. at 295-96 (citing 
transaction reporting requirements found in 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) requiring “a 
domestic financial institution . . . involved in a transaction for the payment, receipt, or transfer 
of United States coins or currency . . . in an amount, denomination, or amount and denomina-
tion, or under circumstances the Secretary prescribes by regulation . . . [to] file a report on the 
transaction”). CTRs also “must disclose the identity of the customer who has the account and the 
customer’s source of funds.” Id. at 296. Additionally, banks are not allowed to inform any person 
involved in a suspicious transaction that the transaction has been reported to the government. Id. 
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). 
121 Sorcher, supra note 118, at 400-04. CIPs specifically require that 
[f]irms . . . obtain the following information [from each customer] prior to open-
ing an account: (1) name; (2) date of birth (for individuals); (3) residential or busi-
ness street address for individuals, or principal place of business, local office or other 
physical location for persons other than individuals; and (4) identification number—
for a U.S. person, a taxpayer identification number (“TIN”); for a non-U.S. person, 
a TIN, a passport number and country of issuance, an alien identification card number 
or the number and country of issuance of any other government-issued document evi-
dencing nationality or residence and bearing a photograph or similar safeguard. 
Id. at 400-01. 
122  31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R) (2006) (including in the definition of “financial institu-
tion . . . any . . . person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or 
any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically 
or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system”); Shetterly, supra note 
55, at 344-45 (describing the Treasury Department’s new IVTS-related authority). This enhanced 
regulation is significant because it is estimated that billions of dollars annually cross many of the 
Arab nations’ and Pakistan’s borders through hawala, which are IVTS “preferred by Ar-
abs[,] . . . from the Arabic word meaning trust.” See id. (“Congress and the Treasury have made 
hawala a priority since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the discovery that hawala were used 
to fund at least two of the highjackers: Mohammad Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi.”). 
123 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
124 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (prohibiting money laundering and 
“[e]ngaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity”). 
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More recently, Senator Levin has pushed to enact the Incorporation 
Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act (ITLEA), which would 
expose the beneficial owners of shell companies.125 Previous versions of the 
ITLEA have enjoyed support from both political parties126 as well as various 
policy and business groups,127 but the Act has also faced significant criticism 
for its reliance on voluntary reporting and lack of significant incentives or 
penalties for nonreporting.128 For example, it conditions state antiterrorism 
funding on an additional identity reporting requirement, but it does not 
penalize states for declining “to verify the information.” 129  Because of 
loopholes in the current regulatory framework, U.S. firms and incorporation 
services are required to collect only minimal identity information. Surpris-
ingly, international identity reporting requirements are more stringent and 
have been adopted almost universally, as discussed below. 
C. Defunding Terrorism: International Efforts 
The fight against terrorist financing requires international collaboration 
not only among nations but also internally among government agencies and 
private firms.130 Although the United States has fallen short with its own 
internal efforts in many respects, there has been a significant international 
push to stop terrorism financing through money laundering, charities, 
trusts, and anonymous shell companies. Foremost among those efforts has 
 
“Under the [MLCA], it is unlawful to intentionally promote . . . [the] avoidance of reporting 
requirements, usually referred to as ‘smurfing.’” Barbot, supra note 39, at 186 (footnote omitted). 
This refers to making “a deposit in an amount slightly less than $10,000” in order to avoid a CTR 
being filed. Id. at n.116 (citing Duncan E. Alford, Anti–Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on 
Financial Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 427, 458 (1994)). The MLCA also 
requires the U.S. Treasury Department to file annual reports detailing its efforts. Id.  
125 S. 1465, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Carr & Grow, supra note 78 (“Senator Carl Lev-
in[,] . . . chairman of the Senate Homeland Security Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee for 
Investigations, has introduced the [ITLEA] each year since 2008.”). 
126 E.g., Press Release, Global Fin. Integrity, Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act Introduced Today (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://www.financialtaskforce.org/2011/ 
08/02/incorporation-transparency-and-federal-law-enforcement-act-introduced-today.  
127 E.g., EJ Fagan, Why We Need the Incorporation and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, FIN. 
TRANSPARENCY COALITION (May 16, 2012), available at http://www.financialtaskforce.org/2012/05/ 
16/why-we-need-the-incorporation-transparency-and-law-enforcement-assistance-act; Press Release, Fin. 
Accountability and Corp. Transparency (FACT) Coal., Civil Society, Business Groups Call on 
Congress to Support Incorporation Transparency, Ban Anonymous U.S. Shell Companies (May 
16, 2012), available at http://www.financialtaskforce.org/2012/05/16/civil-society-business-groups-
call-on-congress-to-support-incorporation-transparency-ban-anonymous-u-s-shell-companies. 
128 See generally Verret, supra note 17. 
129 See 157 CONG. REC. S5255 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
130 Success essentially requires “re-conceptualizing the public good of open financial systems 
as having negative security externalities that must be collectively managed.” Clunan, supra note 63, at 571. 
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been the creation of, and the issuance of recommendations by, the FATF—
an intergovernmental organization working to combat money laundering 
and terrorism financing.131 The FATF was established during the 1989 G-7 
Summit in Paris and has grown to include thirty-six member countries, each 
of which provides experts to serve on the body’s governing panel.132 
Though its recommendations are not legally binding on its members, 
the FATF does require member self-assessments and “blacklist[s]” countries 
it deems “non-cooperative,” for such reasons as “obstacles within a jurisdiction’s 
financial regulatory regime[,] . . . inadequate or lack of resources devoted to 
anti–money laundering efforts, and obstacles to international cooperation.”133 
In addition, FATF-compliant countries threaten countermeasures against 
money from “non-cooperative countries or territories” that “d[o] not correct 
identified problems within one year.”134  
The United Nations has also taken steps to curb terrorism financing and 
money laundering. For example, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) has 
given terrorist designations to Pakistani trusts that have provided financial 
support to terrorists and supported bombing attacks in India.135 In fact, in 
1999—prior to the 9/11 attacks—the U.N. General Assembly adopted the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.136 
This convention “criminalize[s] the collection or provision of funds with the 
knowledge or intent that they be used to conduct certain terrorist activity,” 
implements many of the FATF’s Forty Recommendations on Money 
Laundering, and encourages financial institutions to report suspicious 
transactions.137 A mere seventeen days after 9/11, the UNSC also adopted 
Resolution 1373138—a true centerpiece in the international effort to fight 
 
131 Sorcher, supra note 118, at 405-08.  
132 Id. at 405-06; see also FATF Members and Observers, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/ 
aboutus/membersandobservers (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
133 Bachus, supra note 39, at 851-53; see also High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions, FATF, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf-compliance-oct-
2013.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2013). 
134 Bachus, supra note 39, at 852-53. 
135 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
136 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 
54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (Vol. 1), at 408, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Dec. 9, 1999), 
entered into force Apr. 10, 2002.  
137 Sorcher, supra note 118, at 411.  
138 See Zagaris, supra note 56, at 75-76 (citing S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (requiring states to (1) prevent and suppress the nuancing of terrorist 
financing; (2) freeze without delay the resources of terrorist and terror organizations; (3) prohibit 
anyone from making funds available to terrorist organizations; (4) suppress the recruitment of new 
members by terrorism organizations; (5) deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or 
commit terrorist acts, or those who provide safe havens; (6) afford one another the greatest 
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terrorism, both because of its requirement that states criminalize terrorism 
financing and its creation of an implementing committee.139 The examples 
above represent just a few of the UN’s numerous proactive measures to 
combat terrorism financing.140 
The European Union has also made significant efforts to adopt the 
FATF’s recommendations. One Directive, for instance, closely follows the 
FATF’s Forty Recommendations and requires member states to identify 
customers, keep thorough records, and report any suspicious transactions.141 
The Directive is binding on all EU members and can be enforced through 
legal proceedings.142 The Directive was replaced in 2004—in part due to 
9/11—by a new Directive that “specifically covers terrorist financing and provides 
for more detailed customer identification and verification procedures.”143 
Additionally, because the problem of terrorism financing reaches beyond the 
scope of the European Union’s financial and banking institutions, it has imposed 
“gatekeeper” standards144 on lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents.145  
 
measure of assistance in criminal investigations involving terrorism; and (7) prevent the movement of 
terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and control over travel documentation)).  
139 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging 
Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Coopera-
tion, U.N. Press Release SC/4385 (Sept. 28, 2001), available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 
2001/sc7158.doc.htm; see also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); Gardella, supra note 55, at 125-28 (describing the requirements of the 
resolution); Zagaris, supra note 56, at 75-76 (same). 
140 In addition to the examples described above, “[t]he UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime was the first legally binding multilateral treaty specifically aimed at transnational 
organized crime.” Sorcher, supra note 118, at 411. Also, the “United Nations Office for Drug 
Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) provides member nations with assistance in complying 
with international anti–money laundering standards.” Bachus, supra note 39, at 856 (citing 2 INL, 
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, supra note 50, at XII-52). For a review of several other 
U.N. initiatives, see Lacey & George, supra note 120, at 332-35.  
141 Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 (E.C.). 
142 Sorcher, supra note 118, at 408.  
143 Id.; see also Council Directive 2005/60/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15 (E.C.). 
144 These “gatekeeper” standards originated at the G-8 Summit and have since been endorsed by 
the European Union, FATF, the United States (through the PATRIOT Act), and a host of other 
nations. See Gregory, supra note 62, at 32-38, 46-50. 
145 Id. at 32, 35. The American Bar Association (ABA) created its own Task Force on Gate-
keeper Regulation and Profession in 2002 to monitor compliance with these standards. Id. at 38; 
see also ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION, COM-
MENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION 
ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION PAPER DATED MAY 30, 2002, at 
2-3 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/taskforce/comments.doc.  
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D. Remaining Domestic Challenges 
Despite the complex domestic and international framework that has 
emerged since 9/11, and notwithstanding the enormous sums spent by the 
United States and the international community on policing terrorism 
financing, two major enforcement gaps remain. Moreover, terrorist groups’ 
greater access to funding through virtual channels such as the Internet 
exacerbates these problems.146 
First, the United States’ lax domestic policies and federalism challenges 
to virtual regulation facilitate the formation of anonymous shell companies.147 
Relaxed state laws in Delaware, for example, have allowed Jack Abramoff 
and Viktor Bout—the infamous Russian Arms dealer dubbed the “Merchant 
of Death”—to form anonymous shell corporations.148 Even officials in the 
Cayman Islands, a country widely regarded as a tax haven, criticize that 
“Delaware is today playing faster and looser than the offshore jurisdictions that 
raise hackles in Washington.”149 “Delaware is the state that requires the least 
amount of information,”150 and its approach to incorporation and LLC for-
mation attracts companies from around the world—legitimate and otherwise.151  
Although the federal government wishes to impose more thorough reporting 
requirements (seen most recently through Senator Levin’s sponsorship of 
the ITLEA), federalism issues present another obstacle to implementation. 
For example, in a 2006 report, the FATF specifically noted the United 
States’ failure to designate as offenses noncompliance with certain reporting 
requirements.152 Some of this failure may stem from the anticommandeering 
 
146 See Stephen I. Landman, Funding Bin Laden’s Avatar: A Proposal for the Regulation of Virtual 
Hawalas, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5159, 5180-83 (2009) (discussing the difficulties of regulating 
virtual exchanges and proposing expansions to current law to reach the virtual marketplace). 
147 See Browning, supra note 81, at 1 (“Delaware and . . . other states have business-friendly 
laws that encourage the creation of opaque shell companies, allowing their true owners to be 
disguised or obscured.”). 
148  Id.; Ned Resnikoff, How to Steal a Billion in Taxes, MSNBC (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://www.msnbc.com/all-in/how-steal-billion-in-taxes.  
149 Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
2012, at BU1. 
150 E.g., id. (quoting David Finzer, chief executive of a registration agent that sets up ac-
counts for non-U.S. citizens).  
151 See Verret, supra note 17, at 892-95 (“Delaware has designed its LLC legal regime to facili-
tate freedom of contract to allow parties of LLC agreements to arrange their relations according to 
their particular needs.”). 
152 FATF, supra note 113, at 146-47. Among its many recommendations, the report states that 
“[t]here remains a gap between the policy level and operational level law enforcement work,” 
further noting that “[m]ore refined coordination is needed amongst law enforcement agencies with 
overlapping jurisdictions.” Id. at 301 tbl.1. But see Robert Fromme & Rick Schwein, Operation 
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doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Printz v. United States, which 
prohibits Congress from forcing state and local governments to implement 
federal programs.153 Although Congress made it clear in the PATRIOT Act 
that the United States’ national strategy involves enhanced federal–state 
cooperation,154 it often lacks the mechanisms and resources to constitution-
ally incentivize state compliance.155 And there is ample evidence to suggest 
that states do not voluntarily comply when federal prerogatives run counter 
to state priorities.156 Even the FATF noted that the United States needs 
more effective internal, intrastate cooperation and remarked that the current 
“law enforcement arena appears to be fragmented.”157 Thus, state jurisdic-
tion over the formation of corporations and other important financial 
vehicles, coupled with local unwillingness to bear the costs of national 
antiterrorist programs, hinders a united domestic response against terrorism. 
Second, the United States’ current and suggested framework for fighting 
terrorist financing may raise business privacy and due process concerns. 
U.S. and international policies regarding client identity and suspicious 
activity reporting remain controversial, often because they could compromise 
 
Smokescreen: A Successful Collaboration, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 2007, at 20, 22-24 
(discussing an example of successful federal–state collaboration in fighting crime and terrorism).  
153 See 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitu-
tion’s structural protections of liberty.”); Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1257-61 (2004) (arguing that courts should resist the 
temptation to dilute the anticommandeering doctrine for the sake of counterterrorism). 
154 31 U.S.C. § 5341 (2006) (calling for “[t]he enhancement of[] cooperative efforts between 
the Federal Government and State and local officials”).  
155 See Ernest Young, The Balance of Federalism in Unbalanced Times: Should the Supreme Court 
Reconsider Its Federalism Precedents in Light of the War on Terrorism?, FINDLAW (Oct. 10, 2001), 
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/commentary/20011010_young.html 
(arguing in favor of robust state autonomy even during the War on Terror). Others interpret the 
Constitution as giving the federal government the power to force state and local governments to 
implement antiterrorism programs notwithstanding the anticommandeering doctrine. See, e.g., 
Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 35-36 (2005) (noting that Article 
IV, Section 4 (the Protection Clause) of the Constitution requires the federal government to 
“protect the states from invasion and domestic violence”). The generation of Americans that 
ratified the Constitution’s Protection Clause went through similar problems that “the War on 
Terrorism presents today: Security represents a collective-action dilemma because each state is 
reluctant to contribute to the costs of defending other states although the cost of an attack is not 
geographically confined.” Id. at 36. Yet the Protection Clause guarantees that “the national 
government may enlist the assistance of state and local personnel so long as Congress pays the 
costs of their efforts.” Id. at 36. 
156 See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Introduction, David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium: Our 
New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
1201, 1210 (2003–2004) (examining an instance in which local law enforcement officers refused the 
FBI’s request for assistance, post-9/11, in questioning roughly 5000 Arabs and Muslims in Detroit 
and Portland).  
157 FATF, supra note 113, at 256-58.  
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the attorney–client privilege.158 However, a number of policy tools can 
counterbalance privacy concerns, including the use of “formal nominees” in 
identity reporting requirements.159 Still, the private sector opposes these 
requirements, and balancing a client’s privacy with combatting financial 
crime will most likely continue to be a difficult task. In addition, individuals 
and corporations who seek to transfer money anonymously criticize the 
current regulatory framework on First Amendment grounds.160 
Due process is another private sector concern as assets are frozen under 
arguably overbroad executive powers.161 As prosecutions are carried out 
under the President’s executive International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA) powers, individual litigants have tried—though so far unsuc-
cessfully—to assert due process challenges.162 Additionally, many contend 
that the President’s statutory authority is overbroad, since the power to 
make terrorist designations is sweeping and quasi-judicial.163 These and 
other concerns have stalled progress as Congress attempts to strengthen the 
current legal and regulatory framework. What, if anything, within this 
framework can stop terrorism financing? Are international or domestic 
regulations more effective? The study that follows attempts to answer these 
questions by identifying which countries and institutions comply less 
frequently with identity reporting requirements and the factors that influ-
ence whether an institution agrees to help form a shell company. 
 
158 See id. at 261-62 (discussing suspicious-activity reporting and the attorney–client privi-
lege); see also Marc Loewenthal, Financial Privacy Laws in Conflict, EPOLICY (Aug. 2002), 
http://special.pacificresearch.org/pub/ecp/2002/epolicy08-08.html (criticizing the PATRIOT Act for 
requiring banks to share customer information with the government without notice to the customers). 
159 PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 17, at 59-61.  
160 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down limits on 
campaign expenditures); see also Guiora & Field, supra note 38, at 62-63 (describing the problem of 
money laundering—particularly through IVTS—to fund terrorism, and contrasting such 
illegitimate uses of IVTS with legitimate charitable and religious uses). 
161 See Aloke Chakravarty, Feeding Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility of Aid in a Compre-
hensive Antiterrorism Financing Strategy, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 295, 309 (2010) (stating the 
main challenges to the statutes addressing terrorism funding).  
162 See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(“[T]he Secretary of the Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions that possess or control 
assets of that organization to block all financial transactions involving those assets . . . .”).  
163 See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to 
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury’s order blocking corporate assets under IEEPA). For a more 
detailed explanation of the expansiveness of executive power in the war on terror, see Chakravarty, 
supra note 161, at 308-11.  
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II. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
While the government has done much to disrupt and dismantle terrorist 
networks worldwide,164 security officials and commentators are concerned 
that the United States has not invested sufficient resources to cut off the 
true terrorist lifeline: illicit financing.165 As the United States’ military and 
intelligence efforts prove increasingly effective at dismantling terrorist 
networks, terrorists must seek ever more clandestine approaches to finance 
their activities. As described above, this has led to terrorist organizations 
laundering money through trusts, charities, and shell corporations.166 
The international community has responded by developing policies to 
combat money laundering and terrorism financing.167 For example, inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs) and nations such as the United States 
have enacted extensive regulations that track FATF recommendations.168 
These efforts produced strict regulations governing the formation of shell 
companies. At least on paper, the “anonymous” shell corporation was 
completely prohibited.169 
While these international and domestic laws have been in place for 
years, few empirical studies have investigated their effectiveness. Previous 
articles attempt to show how easy it is to form a shell company, but they 
have only provided anecdotal evidence or a summary of several examples.170 
By contrast, our study used 7462 approaches to 3773 providers in 181 coun-
tries. We randomly assigned a variety of approaches to determine what 
 
164 See, e.g., Neil H. MacBride, No Higher Priority: Fighting Terrorism and Keeping Americans 
Safe, OFF. U.S. ATT’YS, http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefing_room/ns/op-ed1.html (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2014) (praising the FBI’s efforts in arresting “homegrown extremists” and the DOJ’s 
efforts in prosecuting them); McNeill et al., supra note 33; Press Release, President Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university 
(praising U.S. antiterrorism efforts since 9/11).  
165 See, e.g., Kern Alexander, United States Financial Sanctions and International Terrorism (pt. 
1), 17 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 80, 80-88 (2002) (evaluating the multifac-
eted policy response to terror funding since 9/11). 
166 See supra Section I.A. 
167 See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 
257, 295-97 (2011) (discussing the history and challenges of implementing FATF recommendations). 
168 For examples of such U.S. regulations, see supra note 22. 
169 See generally FATF, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUN-
DERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (2012), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/ 
FATF_Recommendations.pdf (discussing the requirement of some form of identification to 
conduct certain transactions, such as a notarized passport copy and certified utility bill, to prohibit 
anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names).  
170 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
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factors cause providers to be more or less likely to comply with domestic 
and international regulations affecting the formation of shell companies.171 
In our study, we attempt to answer the question of how effective the 
post–September 11 regulations have been at curbing the incorporation of 
anonymous shell corporations. We first seek to discover which countries are 
the most compliant and what factors might contribute to noncompliance. 
We then explore whether compliance in the United States differs from that 
elsewhere in the international community. Finally, we compare the results 
from both the international and domestic tests to analyze what factors make 
some countries more or less compliant than others.  
A. Design Study: Finding Providers, Composing Treatments 
To determine the effectiveness of post-9/11 financial regulations, we ana-
lyzed countries’ informal compliance with FATF recommendations and IRS 
regulations by way of private actors, including firms and incorporation 
services providers. 172  Mindful that the field experiment is occasionally 
criticized for contributing only a pragmatic, “what works” analysis,173 we 
focused on larger theoretical questions. Accordingly, this field experiment 
presents more than statistics; we utilize the major international law and 
relations theories to get to the heart of what actually causes compliance.174  
To complete this experiment, we compiled a list of incorporation ser-
vices providers and created a set of emails to be sent from a number of 
aliases through which we posed as international consultants seeking anony-
mous shell corporations. To find and compile the list of providers, because 
no definitive list exists of incorporation services providers, we performed 
 
171 Full experimental results are reported in several other locations. See FINDLEY, NIELSON 
& SHARMAN, supra note 29; Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson & J.C. Sharman, Using Field 
Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation, 67 INT’L 
ORG. 657, 673-77 (2013); Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson & J.C. Sharman, Causes of 
Noncompliance with International Law: A Field Experiment on Anonymous Incorporation 16-34 
(Feb. 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
172 For a more thorough analysis of formal compliance, see Shima Baradaran et al., Does 
International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 743, 749-51 (2013) (reporting findings from a field 
experiment on compliance with international financial transparency laws). Formal compliance is 
easier to gauge because it appears in the steps the nation takes to implement and enforce 
international transparency laws. See Brummer, supra note 167, at 291-92 (discussing the weaknesses 
that arise when international bodies attempt to monitor financial compliance). This, however, is 
not the focus of our study. 
173 See, e.g., Susan D. Hyde, The Future of Field Experiments in International Relations, 628 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 75 (2010) (noting that field experiments are often 
criticized for failing to address “big questions” and only dealing with “insignificant phenomena”). 
174 For a discussion of managerialism and its intersection with this study, see infra note 201 
and accompanying text.  
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Internet searches for terms such as “company formation” and “business 
law.” We successfully collected a pool of 3773 corporations and law firms 
drawn from nearly every nation of the world—181 to be precise. Of these, 
1785 were from the United States, 444 from other Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 1039 from 
developing nations, and 505 from countries with reputations as tax havens. 
This does not, of course, represent every incorporation services provider, 
but the sample size is sufficiently large for the purposes of this Article.  
We conducted two experiments using this pool of providers. First, we 
sought to test the effectiveness of international transparency law—
particularly FATF regulations—using a pool of 2051 firms that included 63 
U.S. firms and all of the non-U.S. firms. Second, we subjected the remaining 
1722 U.S. firms to the same FATF conditions but also presented additional 
conditions, including a treatment to test the effectiveness of IRS regulations 
on provider behavior. In both experiments we also explicitly tested the ease 
with which customers who match the profile of terrorists could incorporate 
anonymously. All of these conditions are explained below. 
Next, to complete each of these experiments, we randomly assigned and 
sent emails that were embedded with different experimental conditions. 
Before discussing how these treatments differed, we first note that each 
email shared several common features: (1) each was sent from a fictitious 
customer seeking a consultant; (2) each provided a rationale for wanting a 
shell company (including reduced liability and confidentiality); and (3) each 
asked about cost and identity document requirements. Beyond these 
commonalities, each email was specifically crafted to test compliance with 
either an international or domestic regulation. Furthermore, the emails 
allegedly originated from various areas of the world ranging from low-
corruption OECD nations 175  to nations that are often associated with 
terrorism. The recipient firm was thus able to decide to either comply or 
refuse to comply with transparency standards. 
1. Placebo 
The first email was our “placebo” or baseline condition,176 which was sent 
from one of eight smaller, wealthier countries. Several factors made the 
 
175 The OECD includes twenty original countries, including those listed in the text and 
other relatively wealthy countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. See LIST OF 
OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES—RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
176 See Appendix A. 
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placebo emails appear the least suspicious. First, the placebo emails hailed 
from relatively low-corruption OECD countries with conceivably less risk 
of terrorist influence. These placebo countries were Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden—
each listed as among the least corrupt countries on Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).177 For convenience, we refer to 
them collectively as “Norstralia.” The variety of placebo countries ensures 
that a negative means event—for instance, a lurid transnational financial 
crime story or a government scandal—might bias results. Therefore, other 
than asking for anonymous incorporation, the placebo email does not 
contain anything especially suspicious. Where the email hailed from a non-
English speaking nation, we injected spelling, syntax, or grammar errors to 
enhance authenticity. This placebo email served as a benchmark with which 
to compare response rates and requests for identity documentation under 
the remaining conditions.  
Including the placebo, we examined twelve different conditions, four of 
which we report in this Article and summarize in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
 
Key Features 
Placebo Alias originates from low-corruption, minor-power “Norstralia” country. 
Terrorism Alias claims citizenship in one of four nations associated with terrorism 
and purports to work in Saudi Arabia for an Islamic charity. 
FATF Alias notes that the FATF requires identification. 
IRS Alias notes that the IRS enforces disclosure requirements (for U.S. 
firms only).  
 
177 Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/ 
cpi2012/results (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). We excluded other top ten CPI countries, such as 
Switzerland and Singapore, because they are associated with financial secrecy or other tax-haven 
conditions. Interviews and other corporate sector materials indicate that a prospective client’s 
country of residence and business sector are the primary indicators of risk to the finance industry. 
See, e.g., KPMG INT’L, GLOBAL ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY 2007, at 25 fig.11 
(2007), available at http://us.kpmg.com/microsite/fslibrarydotcom/docs/AML2007FULL.pdf 
(indicating, graphically, important factors banks consider under a “risk-based approach” when they 
are approached by a potential client). 
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2. Terrorism Treatment 
In the second treatment, we posed as terrorist risks.178 The aliases pur-
ported to consult for Islamic charities, work in Saudi Arabia, and originate 
in countries recognized as sites of suicide terrorism—Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Palestine, and Yemen.179 In this treatment, we tested the effectiveness of two 
of the FATF’s recommendations: the warning against “[c]ountries identified 
by credible sources as providing funding or support for terrorist activities 
that have designated terrorist organisations operating within them”180 and 
the requirement that companies screen “[c]harities and other ‘not for profit’ 
organisations which are not subject to monitoring or supervision.”181 The 
combination of individuals (1) coming from a country perceived as a host to 
terrorists, (2) working for an Islamic charity, and (3) seeking financial 
secrecy should present a very obvious terrorist-financing risk.  
3. FATF and IRS Treatments 
Our FATF treatment adds to the basic control template a straightfor-
ward reference to the FATF.182 As with the control template, the email 
purportedly originates from one of the eight “Nostralia” countries, but here, 
the fictitious consultant directly references FATF provisions that require 
the production of identification to create a shell corporation.183 However, 
after referencing the provisions, the consultant reaffirms a desire for 
anonymity and asks what documents are actually needed.  
We developed this treatment to test the international law and relations 
theories of managerialism184 and legalization.185 These theories imply that 
noncompliance results from either ignorance of the law or ignorance of the 
conditions under which the law applies. Accordingly, we would expect to see 
 
178 See Appendix B. 
179 See generally ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUI-
CIDE TERRORISM 253-64 app. I (2005) (cataloging the date, weapon, location, and death toll of 
suicide terror attacks from 1980 to 2003). 
180  FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING 23 (2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/ 
fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Principles%20and%20Procedures.pdf. 
181 Id. at 24.  
182 See Appendix C. 
183 See id. at 26. 
184 See generally Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Rela-
tions and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2d ed. 2002). For a more detailed discussion of manageri-
alism in the context of the results from our experiment, see infra note 201. 
185 See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000).  
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high rates of compliance in response to this condition because the email 
both invokes the relevant law and suggests that this specific context is one 
in which it applies. 
The next treatment—the IRS treatment—builds upon the FATF treat-
ment by additionally mentioning the possibility of IRS sanctions in the case 
of noncompliance. 186 Although the IRS does not enforce identity reporting 
requirements, its website lists the agency as an FATF partner,187 and we 
included this information to see if it would act as an additional deterrent. 
Our expectation was that the additional information would raise the propor-
tion of providers insistent on compliance and lower the number of those 
willing to do business, noncompliance notwithstanding.  
B. Coding the Responses 
1. Compliance Coding 
After sending out emails according to the aforementioned protocol, we 
coded five types of responses to measure treatment effects: (1) no response, 
(2) refusal, (3) compliant, (4) partially compliant, and (5) noncompliant.  
Some typical responses identified the email as a possible scam,188 while 
others arguably sought more information and requested a higher premium.189 
A complete lack of response, which could have occurred for a number of 
reasons, was coded as “no response.” When corporation service providers 
(CSPs) simply refused service, irrespective of the stated reason, we coded 
the responses as “refusal.” 
To be “compliant,” a CSP must have asked for specific government-issued 
photo identification, whether notarized or certified. The requests generally 
involved a notarized photocopy of a passport picture page, which the CSP would 
store should law enforcement or regulatory officials demand documentation.190  
“Partially compliant” CSPs requested some form of identification, but did 
not request notarized copies of government-issued identity documentation. 191 
“Noncompliant” CSPs were those that offered to assist in forming an anony-
mous shell corporation without requiring any photo identification whatsoever.192  
 
186 See Appendix D. 
187 IRS, International Investigations—Criminal Investigation (CI), http://www.irs.gov/uac/International- 
Investigations-Criminal-Investigation-(CI) (last updated Nov. 14, 2013). 
188 See Appendix E.1 (Indignant Response). 
189 See Appendix E.2 (Greedy Response). 
190 See Appendix E.3 (Compliant Response). 
191 See Appendix E.4 (Partially compliant Response). 
192 See Appendix E.5 (Noncompliant Response). 
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To ensure that responses were coded accurately and consistently, each 
response was coded twice by separate researchers using a formal manual. In 
the case of discrepancies, a senior researcher arbitrated the codes and 
assigned them a final designation.  
2. Random Assignment 
This experiment’s objective was to determine what factors make a CSP 
more or less likely to comply with international and domestic regulations on 
the formation of shell companies. Treatments were randomized, like in any 
other randomized experiment, to neutralize variation caused by confounding 
factors. Like patients in a randomized medical trial, the CSPs were randomly 
distributed to each of the different treatments. Because of the large pool of 
CSPs, we could reasonably expect that extraneous factors were balanced and, 
therefore, any changes to the outcomes would be due to the experimental 
conditions. In this way, we could accurately measure differences against the 
initial control group and correctly attribute differences in compliance rates to 
the singular factor we drew out in each of the treatments.  
C. Results and Findings 
1. Brief Summary of Compliance Rates 
After we sent our treated emails and coded the responses, three key 
findings emerged from the study.  
First, emails that presented a heightened risk of terrorism were, at least 
in part, an effective deterrent to noncompliance. Indeed, it was the most 
effective treatment in our study. Yet it raised plenty of cause for concern, 
especially because it produced mixed results, decreasing both noncompliance 
(good) and partial compliance (bad). 
Second, we found that including information on international and do-
mestic regulations had much less of an impact than we had anticipated. 
While the mention of U.S. regulations actually increased compliance, 
mentioning international regulations had no measurable impact.  
Third, compliance within countries and U.S. states was inconsistent 
with any international relations theory. Compliance rates varied drastically 
from country to country, as well as among the individual U.S. states, 
independent of wealth or level of development. States with lax financial 
regulations, such as Wyoming and Delaware, were the worst offenders in the 
sample. They made (with relatively little hesitation) offers to assist in 
forming shell companies, regardless of the risks involved and the information 
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provided. Surprisingly, countries that are notoriously known as tax havens 
were actually some of the most compliant countries in our study. And tax 
havens as a group far outpaced OECD countries in compliance with 
international financial transparency standards. 
2. Complete Discussion of Findings 
We categorize our findings into five main sections: (1) overall effective-
ness of know-your-client (KYC) rules requiring identity documentation, 
both among all countries generally and specifically among U.S. CSPs; (2) 
relative compliance rates among tax havens, OECD countries, and developing 
nations; (3) (in)sensitivity of CSPs to terrorism risks; (4) effect on compliance 
rates when CSPs were given more information about the rules and penalties 
for noncompliance; and (5) relative compliance rates among individual states 
within the United States and possible explanations of the disparate results.  
In describing the compliance rates in each of these categories, we also 
refer to a “Risk Aversion Level” that measures the average number of CSPs 
we had to approach within a given subset of providers before we received a 
noncompliant offer to incorporate anonymously. Thus, if the noncompliance 
rate was five percent, the Risk Aversion Level would be twenty. Lower Risk 
Aversion Levels indicate that it was easier to find noncompliant CSPs. Very 
high Risk Aversion Levels often exist alongside very high rates of compli-
ance (e.g., the Cayman Islands), very high rates of partial compliance (e.g., 
Denmark), very high rates of refusal and nonresponse (e.g., Utah), or some 
combination thereof. Thus, a high Risk Aversion Level could be attributable 
to a combination of these different patterns.  
Basic FATF requirements mandate that authorities have “adequate, accurate, 
and timely information on the [real,] beneficial owners[]” of any given shell 
company.193 Compliance with this rule is essential to fight a range of 
financial crimes and combat terrorism, and CSPs comply with this rule only 
if they collect fundamental identity documents. Yet before our experiment, 
policymakers had no data about the extent to which the requirements are 
actually followed.194  
a. Overall International Know-Your-Client Effectiveness  
Our results demonstrate low effectiveness of international and domestic 
KYC laws, particularly within the United States. When compliance is 
 
193 FATF, supra note 169, at 22. 
194 The only compliance information available has been FATF audits and reports submitted 
to the FATF by signatories. 
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measured across all countries for the placebo condition (1112 inquiries in the 
international sample, 816 emails in the U.S.), the noncompliance level for 
the international sample, including the 63 U.S. firms, is 8.7%. This trans-
lates to an overall Risk Aversion Level internationally of 11.5. The compli-
ance rate includes nonresponses in the denominator, since some CSPs may 
fail to reply deliberately—thus complying with international law in a "soft" 
way.195 In contrast, the noncompliance level for the placebo condition in the 
U.S. sample is 11.3% and the Risk Aversion Level is therefore 8.8, more 
than 20% worse than in the international sample. This demonstrates that 
creating an anonymous shell company is, quite possibly, easier in the United 
States than in most other countries.  
However, this gap is likely widened by two main factors. First, there is a 
higher nonresponse rate from U.S. CSPs in the sample (78.0% compared to 
49.1% in the international sample). The proportion of U.S. providers who 
replied to our inquiries and required no identity documentation whatsoever 
was 41.5%, which is roughly two-and-a-half times the 16.5% average in the 
international sample. To test the behavior of those firms that failed to reply, 
we sent a second email from a Norstralia alias simply asking if the firm was still 
in business and assisting customers but making no mention of confidentiality, 
taxes, or liability. The results show that the vast majority (83% internationally 
and 94% in the U.S.) of nonresponsive CSPs are not soft refusals—instead, 
they fail to respond to any inquiry, even the most innocuous request.  
Second, there is great disparity in compliance rates between U.S. busi-
ness law firms and other U.S. CSPs.196 Business law firms replied at much 
lower rates than other CSPs (15.9% in the domestic and 41.8% in the 
international sample). The other, non–business law firm CSPs were also 
especially unlikely to ask for identity documentation. In fact, only a tiny 
proportion of U.S. providers actually met the more stringent international 
identity requirements (9 of 1722 U.S. providers, or 0.523%). Overall, U.S. 
business law firms were much less likely to violate international laws that 
prevent the funding of terrorism—mostly by refusing service. 
 
 
195 Internationally, 49.1% of our approaches did not generate a reply. The ratio was even 
higher in the U.S. sample at 78.0%, and U.S. law firms were highest at 84.1%. What does this high 
level of nonresponse mean for our results? This could be considered “soft compliance” because a 
provider thought the request was too suspicious. If this is generally true, most of the nonresponses 
could be judged as evidence of a functioning regulatory framework. On the other hand, if 
nonresponses bear no relation to de facto risk screening and are merely a product of commercial 
decisions, uninterest, or disorganization, then nonresponses cannot be regarded as evidence of a 
functioning regulatory system. 
196 See infra Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 1.1: International Risk Aversion Level by Treatment197 
 
Figure 1.2: Domestic Risk Aversion Level by Treatment198 
 
 
197 International and U.S. results are reported separately. Asterisks denote statistical signifi-
cance: ***p < 0.01 in two-tailed–difference-in-mean tests compared to the placebo. 
198 Asterisks denote statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05 in two-tailed–difference-in-
mean tests compared to the placebo. 
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b. Relative Compliance Rates Among Countries 
A country’s relative wealth seems to have no impact on its likelihood to 
enforce international laws that prevent the funding of terror. In our experi-
ment, wealthy OECD countries (including the United States) were actually 
the least compliant with international identity incorporation requirements. 
This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that poor countries would be 
least compliant.199 For developing countries, the average Risk Aversion 
Level is 11.9, whereas for OECD countries it is 7.8 (and, for tax havens, it is 
24.4). This finding is significant because it demonstrates that enforcing 
identity requirements might not be expensive, since poorer countries fare 
better on average.200 Thus, countries might fail to comply because of an 
unwillingness to enforce the rules, rather than any kind of incapacity, as some 
experts have posited.201 In fact, incorporation services (excluding law firms) 
in the United States are the least compliant of those in any country with 
which we communicated more than fifteen times. 
 
Figure 2.1: Risk Aversion Level by Type of Country Internationally 
 
199 See infra Figure 2.1. 
200 See generally Baradaran et al., supra note 172.  
201 These findings contradict the managerial theory, which states that noncompliance results 
from a lack of resources and information. Abram and Antonia Chayes, central proponents of this 
theory, argue that the best way to “manage” compliance is to provide states with information and 
resources, rather than to threaten sanctions. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On 
Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 204-05 (1993).  
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Figure 2.2: Risk Aversion Level by Provider Type 
This finding contradicts the overwhelming consensus that tax havens 
provide secrecy and have lax regulation, particularly for shell companies. 
This traditional conception of tax havens is articulated by G20 communi-
qués, NGOs, and the U.S. media.202 However, service providers located in tax 
havens made it surprisingly more difficult to form anonymous shell companies 
than those in OECD countries and developing nations. In fact, tax havens 
were more compliant than any other country group, with a Risk Aversion 
Level of 24.4—much higher than the OECD score of 7.8. This means that 
it was over three times more difficult to establish an untraceable shell 
company in a tax haven than in an OECD country. Some of these tax 
havens, including Jersey, the Cayman Islands, and the Isle of Man, are 
among the most compliant in the world, while OECD nations such as the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and the United States rank near the 
bottom (see Figure 3). It is also important to note that our experiment does 
 
202 See, e.g., Christopher Matthews, The Real Problem with Offshore Tax Havens, TIME (July 
26, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/26/the-real-problem-with-offshore-tax-havens (noting 
the common notion of (offshore) tax havens as “sun-drenched islands ruled by corrupt govern-
ments in cahoots with felonious plutocrats”); Robert M. Morgenthau, These Islands Aren’t Just a 
Shelter from Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2012, at SR8 (“The secrecy laws in these tax havens are at 
the root of serious crimes: fraud, money laundering and international terrorism.”); cf. Stephen 
Troiano, The U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Impact on Tax Havens, 17 NEW ENG. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 345-46 (2011) (explaining that “a responsible and fair system needs to be 
implemented in order to curb the abuse of tax havens . . . through multilateral action”).  
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not consider tax havens compliant unless they explicitly require notarized 
identification for beneficial owners of the company, which helps to avoid 
legal fictions. 203 
 
   
 
203 For a description of how corporations and shell companies disguise beneficial ownership, 
see Azam Ahmed, In Caymans, It’s Simple to Fill a Hedge Fund Board, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 1, 
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/in-caymans-its-simple-to-fill-a-hedge-fund-board.  
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Figure 3: Compliance Rate by Country for Nations with  
at Least Twenty-Five Approaches204 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
204  The bar chart reflects the overall compliance rate, where firms demanding notarized 
photo ID and refusing service are together shown as a proportion of all firms responding to 
inquiries. Countries were included if we received more than twenty-five responses. All twenty-five 
U.S. firms from the U.S.-only sample (Figure 4) are included with the sixty-three U.S. firms in 
the international sample. 
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c. (In)Sensitivity to Terrorism Risks  
Our terrorism treatment produced mixed results. To begin, customers 
shopping under this treatment were less likely to receive a reply. In fact, 
nearly 60% of requests in the international sample and more than 80% in 
the domestic sample received no response, which suggests a significantly 
greater number of “soft” refusals compared to the placebo. Also, the results 
demonstrate that the terrorism treatment causes significantly lower non-
compliance rates compared to the placebo, which suggests that it is more 
difficult for potential terrorists to incorporate anonymously.205  
However, the terrorism treatment also decreased the rate of partial com-
pliance in the international pool. Firms were less likely to ask possible 
terrorists for at least some non-notarized form of identification compared to 
the placebo condition. For instance, the partial compliance rate in the 
international sample was only 11.1% for the terrorism condition compared to 
16.6% with the placebo. This result may indicate that the level of risk 
tolerated by a large number of firms is higher with the terrorism treatment 
than with others. Furthermore, firms that recognize the terrorism red flags 
may actually want to be left in the dark about client identity to avoid 
potential liability.206 
The results were similar in the U.S. sample. Potential terrorists received 
fewer refusals when compared to the international sample. However, in 
contrast to the international sample, virtually no firms asked for supporting 
identification in the United States. The only way U.S. firms complied with 
FATF standards was through refusals. It is thus particularly worrisome that 
the refusal rate dropped so dramatically in the U.S. sample. In other words, 
it was easier to form a terrorist organization in the United States than in the 
rest of the world—a result made more troubling when one considers the lower 
overall U.S. response rates. As a share of responses, U.S. CSPs were easily the 
most willing to form anonymous shells for individuals matching a terrorist 
 
205 The federal government has made efforts to provide incorporation services providers 
information on “red flags” that indicate terrorist financing, which may have contributed to this 
finding. See generally, e.g., FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 16 (providing 
examples of “red flags”). 
206 In some ways, this is not surprising given the lax domestic regulation in many countries, 
including the United States. For one profound anecdote, see All Things Considered: Shell Game: 2,000 
Firms Based in One Simple House (NPR radio broadcast July 2, 2011, 4:27 PM) (describing a home in 
Wyoming that houses 2000 shell companies with little oversight), available at 
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/02/137573513/shell-game-2-000-firms-based-in-one-simple-house. The desire 
for money is also at the heart of these results, because incorporation services providers stand to 
profit greatly and they are an integral part of many economies, including that of the Netherlands. 
Crouch, supra note 77.  
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profile. Certainly, it was harder to incorporate anonymously for the aliases in the 
terrorism condition than the others—but it still proved disturbingly easy. 
Overall, the terrorism condition findings show that relying on CSPs to 
decline customers that pose a terrorism risk may not adequately deter 
terrorism financiers. Though riskier customers should receive heightened 
scrutiny, CSPs were ineffective at screening corrupt customers. In many 
cases, CSPs did not even require identifying information from customers 
posing an obvious risk of terrorism. As such, policymakers may want to 
reconsider a “risk-based approach” in domestic regulations and incorpora-
tion standards. Additional government oversight or domestic penalties may 
prove more effective in improving firms’ scrutiny.207 
d. Effect of Additional Information: IRS 
We tested two different questions in the subsequent treatments: (1) 
whether informing providers about the rules makes them more likely to 
follow them (FATF treatment) and (2) whether raising the prospect of 
penalties makes providers any more likely to comply with KYC rules (IRS 
treatment). We found, in brief, that (1) information does not induce addi-
tional CSP compliance; and (2) priming CSPs with a reference to a well-
known domestic enforcer partially induces compliance.  
Our experiment demonstrated that informing firms about international 
laws requiring identifying information for clients did not increase adherence 
to those laws. There was little difference between the placebo (11.5 interna-
tional, 8.9 U.S.) and the FATF treatments’ Risk Aversion Levels (10.9 
international, 10.1 U.S.). However, the prospect of IRS enforcement 
significantly decreased the noncompliance rate in the United States, thereby 
boosting the Risk Aversion Level from 8.8 (placebo) to 13.2 (IRS). These 
findings demonstrate two important points: (1) it is not ignorance of the law 
that causes global noncompliance; and (2) the threat of IRS enforcement (a 
possible domestic penalty) has a greater effect than knowledge of FATF 
standards (a potential international penalty).  
 
207 In the United States, a number of agencies are tasked with overseeing screening for trans-
actions that have a high potential for involvement in terrorist financing. For example, the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Treasury, acting under the 
authority of the PATRIOT Act, have jointly issued final rules regarding identity verification 
programs and requirements. U.S. ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/ 
industryoversight/antimoneylaundering/index.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).  
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e. Variation Among U.S. States 
There was considerable variation among the individual U.S. states con-
cerning identity requirements. Wyoming, Delaware, and Nevada were 
among the worst in compliance rates—demonstrating that providers in 
these states are most likely to sell untraceable companies to foreign cli-
ents.208 The U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN), recently chided these states, as well as Oregon, for 
being “particularly appealing” locations to form shell companies.209 It comes 
as no surprise that these states have some of the worst compliance rates 
because, as discussed previously, they also have the most lax identity 
requirements for forming a shell company.210 Yet a more careful analysis of 
the states we found to be most and least risk-averse is in order.  
Why do states continue to allow lax identity-reporting requirements 
despite the accompanying risks of corruption and terrorism? One answer is 
large profits. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney for Manhattan, recently 
observed: “Secrecy [in forming shell companies] has become a big busi-
ness.”211 In fact, many major U.S. corporations, including Exxon, Chevron, 
and Rio Tinto, use a number of Delaware subsidiary companies to transact 
business.212 However, there is not enough federal involvement to prevent this 
longstanding practice.213 While legislation such as the ITLEA214 would allow 
the federal government to require states to impose more thorough identity 
reporting requirements, it has continually been blocked in congressional 
committee.215 Moreover, while federal regulation is one way to increase 
 
208 See infra Figure 4 (Compliance Rate by State).  
209 See Wayne, supra note 149. FinCEN also noted that Delaware is the worst offender. Id. The U.S. 
Treasury, together with multiple agencies including the IRS, has formed a working group to assess the 
threat of money laundering. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESS-
MENT (2005), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/ 
mlta.pdf. Unsurprisingly, one of the working group’s reports noted that shell companies and trusts 
were major areas of concern in states like Delaware and Wyoming. Id. at 47-50. As financial 
institutions across the United States are better informed regarding the threat of terrorist financing, 
and as they report suspicious activity more effectively (including through SARs), we hope that this 
activity will decline. 
210 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.  
211 Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., The Great Debate: It’s Time to Eliminate Anonymous Shell Companies, 
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/09/its-time-to-eliminate-
anonymous-shell-companies. 
212 See Wayne, supra note 149.  
213 Id. 
214 Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465, 113th Cong. (2013).  
215  See S. 1483 (112th): Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, 
GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1483 (last visited Jan. 24, 2014); supra note 
125 and accompanying text.  
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oversight, another may be to compare the oversight regimes of the least- and 
most-compliant states. In particular, the states found to have no instances of 
noncompliance—including Arkansas, Maine, Utah, and Minnesota—should 
be studied to determine if any specific regulations induced greater compli-
ance.216 At the very least, these results will be instructive to state policy-
makers interested in creating a business-friendly environment but wary of 
opening their doors to terrorism and corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 While there have not been studies comparing compliance among the various states, an 
FATF review of U.S. compliance with FATF regulations and domestic financial enforcement 
measures found that “[t]he law enforcement arena appears to be fragmented,” partially due to 
overlapping jurisdictions and mixed roles for task forces. FATF, supra note 113, at 256-57. The 
report did note, however, that thirty-seven states, as well as the District of Columbia, have joined 
with the Money Transmitter Regulators Association (a nonprofit organization) to draft model 
legislation and regulate money-service businesses. Id. at 256.  
 Also, in a study of the role of shell companies in the various states, FinCEN noted that while 
“some states require the reporting of information on ownership, no state requires the reporting of 
information on beneficial ownership.” FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 16, at 
3 n.2 (emphases added). FinCEN also found that fourteen of the states with the “least transparency” 
also had absolutely no requirement to report the identities of LLC members or managers. Id. at 9. 
Whether there is a more direct correlation between stringency of state regulations and ease of 
forming a shell company is a topic for further study and consideration.  
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Figure 4: Compliance Rate by State217 
 
 
 
217  Similar to Figure 3, the bar chart shows compliant and refusing firms together as a pro-
portion of all responses. States were included if we received five or more responses to our 
inquiries from firms residing in the state. 
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III. THE FUTURE OF THE WAR ON FINANCIAL TERROR  
The results of our international global field experiment demonstrate that 
domestic policies implemented in the war on terrorist financing have fallen 
short. International and domestic laws since 9/11 have worked to increase 
information sharing and have increased restrictions on the financial sector, 
but many firms are still willing to aid in forming anonymous shell companies. 
Our experiment challenges these laws by exposing the large gaps that exist 
between goals and practice. 
Specifically, we tested the ease of forming an anonymous shell company 
without adhering to the identity requirements of universally accepted 
international laws. The results were disturbing. International laws requiring 
customer identification to form shell companies are not effective. Almost 
half of the companies we approached did not ask for proper identification, 
and twenty-two percent did not require any identity documents. We also 
found that knowledge of international laws does not increase the likelihood 
that firms will require identity information.  
Our results further showed that forming an anonymous shell company 
capable of helping to finance terrorism is much easier within the United 
States than abroad. In fact, it was easier to form an anonymous shell 
company in the United States than in any other country.218 Within the 
United States, the worst offenders of lax enforcement of international 
corporate transparency standards were Delaware, Wyoming, and Nevada—
typically considered the most business-friendly states. 
In combination, the above results are not good news for the current domestic 
and international regulatory framework. Shell companies are widely available 
and easy to procure. More developed OECD countries—including the United 
States and others that participate directly in the FATF—are some of the worst 
offenders of the identity reporting requirements, according to our study. We 
found that it is three times easier to form an anonymous shell company in an 
OECD country than in the oft-reviled tax havens. Surprisingly, tax havens as a 
group are the hardest places in the world to form anonymous shell companies.  
On the other hand, U.S. firms were less likely to aid an individual seeking 
to form an anonymous shell company when we provided them with information 
about IRS regulations. In fact, stating that IRS regulations required disclosure 
(even though there is no such requirement) induced more compliance than 
mentioning the substantive international FATF recommendations—which had 
 
218 See supra Figure 3 (Compliance Rate by Country). U.S. incorporation services ranked at the 
very bottom of our sample for risk aversion. U.S. service providers generally (including both law firms 
and incorporation services providers) still fell into the bottom third of all countries in the sample.  
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no effect at all. This empirical evidence supports incorporation of FATF 
recommendations—particularly more stringent identity requirements—into 
domestic regulations, as opposed to relying on the perceived weight of interna-
tional standards.219 Thus, our experiment leaves hope that increased domestic 
regulation and enforcement of international laws could improve compliance. 
Indeed, it is highly likely that tax havens perform so well because of vigilant 
domestic enforcement of international standards. 
Our research suggests that governments must demonstrate a commit-
ment to enforce international regulations and work more closely with the 
private sector if they wish to curb terrorism financing. Two important 
findings here demonstrate that close collaboration between governments 
and the private sector provides some hope. First, there is great variation 
among nations’ compliance rates with international identity requirements, a 
fact that demonstrates different levels of commitment among governments 
throughout the world. Ironically, the countries that are most compliant are 
tax havens.220 But upon further examination, this finding is not as surprising 
as it may seem. In tax havens, government regulators work very closely with 
private firms to enforce KYC regulations and other identity requirements.221 
 
219 See 158 CONG. REC. S5093, 5104-05 (daily ed. July 18, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl 
Levin) (calling for Congress to address tax havens and combat “offshore tax abuses”); FIN. 
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 16, at 14 (suggesting outreach to state govern-
ments to address “vulnerabilities in the state incorporation process”); Navin Beekarry, The 
International Anti–Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A 
Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 137, 
155-93 (2011) (evaluating factors affecting FATF compliance); Bradley J-M Runyon, Money 
Laundering: New Legislation and New Regulations, But Is It Enough?, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 337, 342-43 
(1999) (explaining pre-9/11 deficiencies in domestic legislation regulating money laundering). 
220 See supra Figure 3. Our findings strongly suggest that notorious tax havens like the Ba-
hamas, the Cayman Islands, and the Isle of Man are actually quite compliant in terms of requiring 
identity documentation. However, the FATF placed these nations on its blacklist as recently as 2000. 
See Peter Lilley, The FATF ‘Blacklist,’ DIRTY DEALING, http://www.dirtydealing.org/IMAGES/ 
fatfblacklist/The%20FATF%20Blacklist.pdf (last updated Mar. 2006); see also INL, supra note 53. 
Furthermore, these countries still carry a reputation as sites for money laundering, which may be 
partially due to political rhetoric. See Daniel J. Mitchell, Tax Havens Are Not Money Laundering Centers, 
CATO INST. (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.cato.org/blog/tax-havens-are-not-money-laundering-centers.  
 Other studies, as well as the FATF’s most recent categorization of “high risk” jurisdictions, 
do not list any of these so-called tax havens as high-risk countries. See, e.g., id. (citing Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing: High Risk Jurisdictions, BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE, 
http://baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/LISTE.jpg (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (mapping “nations 
where there actually is a high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing” (emphasis 
added))); see also HIGH-RISK AND NON-COOPERATIVE JURISDICTIONS, supra note 133 
(identifying jurisdictions with “strategic deficiencies,” notably not including any tax haven 
countries as of October 2013).  
221 This statement is based on author interviews with CSPs and government regulators at 
conferences in various locations in the tax havens. Additionally, officials in these nations have been 
very outspoken about their efforts to control money laundering and shell companies. See, e.g., 
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These governments understand the importance of business clients and want 
to maintain a respectable reputation internationally for incorporation and 
banking.222 With this close government oversight—and despite the negative 
press some tax havens have received over the years223—many maintained 
perfect compliance in our field experiment. Many others were nearly perfect.  
By contrast, a number of U.S. states such as Delaware, Nevada, and 
Wyoming have abysmal compliance records. The United States’ failure to 
enact domestic legislation that implements international requirements to 
promote identity transparency224 has facilitated a race to the bottom. States 
appear willing to incorporate anyone—including, as our experiment demon-
strates, high-risk clients.225 The extremely low compliance levels of Delaware 
compared to those of the tax havens is most disconcerting. States like Delaware 
compete with tax haven nations to attract business clients, but they have chosen 
opposite approaches, with Delaware and similar states allowing noncompliance 
 
Ambassador Curtis A. Ward, Caribbean Res. & Pol’y Ctr., Panel on National Security, Threat of 
Drugs, Terrorism and Smuggling at the Northern Caribbean Conference on Economic Coopera-
tion: Security Imperatives for the Northern Caribbean (Dec. 17, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.caribbeanresearchandpolicycenter.org/publications/docs/Security_Imperatives_for_the_
Northern_Caribbean.pdf) (proposing the adoption and implementation of “minimum security 
standards” to combat money laundering and terror financing). For example, officials in the British 
Virgin Islands have led a campaign with the private sector to foster development of legitimate 
businesses within the nation. See Livia Freeman, British Virgin Islands, IBA ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING 
FORUM, http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/northamerica/British_Virgin_Islands.aspx (last updated 
Nov. 1, 2010) (describing money laundering regulations and legislation in the British Virgin Islands).  
222 Many of these countries have very recently enacted stricter legislation on shell company 
formation. For instance, the Isle of Man has given law enforcement greater power to conduct 
financial reviews when individuals are suspected of criminal activity. See, e.g., Isle of Man, KNOW 
YOUR COUNTRY, http://www.knowyourcountry.com/isleofman1111.html (last updated Mar. 25, 
2013) (detailing legislation to combat money laundering on the Isle of Man). Also, in 2007, 
Bermuda created the independent Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) to investigate suspicious 
financial activity in the island nation. See, e.g., FIN. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BERMUDA, 
http://www.fia.bm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).  
223 See, e.g., Steven Hsieh, Offshore Tax Havens Robbed States of Nearly $40 Billion in 2011, 
ALTERNET (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/economy/offshore-tax-havens-robbed-states-
nearly-40-billion-2011 (noting that tax havens cost U.S. states $40 billion in lost revenue in 2011, in 
addition to roughly $150 billion in federal revenue); John O’Callaghan & Rachel Armstrong, New 
Rules, Tough Talk as Singapore Seeks to End Tax Haven Image, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/14/us-singapore-tax-idUSBRE89D0GM20121014 (expressing 
Singapore’s concern over its reputation as a “magnet for tax evaders” and highlighting actions it is 
taking to change that image).  
224 As discussed above, Senator Levin has introduced the ITLEA in several previous Con-
gresses, but the bill has failed to even emerge from committee. See supra note 215 and accompanying 
text. The bill was reintroduced on August 1, 2013, as S. 1465, and was referred to committee on the 
same day. See S. 1465: Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1465 (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).  
225 In the domestic sample, nearly six percent of firms were still found noncompliant when a 
request was sent from a source with obvious indicators of terrorism. See infra Table 3. 
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and the tax havens collectively maintaining the strictest compliance with 
international regulations. Significantly, these findings suggest that greater 
compliance results from a government’s higher level of commitment to interna-
tional requirements and close collaboration with the business sector, even in 
states or nations that work competitively to attract business clients.  
Greater government commitment is associated with a number of essen-
tial components of effective oversight, such as more stringent identity 
reporting requirements. Another component is informing financial institu-
tions of KYC requirements and the criteria for “suspicious” transactions.226 
Of course, the financial sector may respond better if it is working with the 
government for the mutually beneficial goal of countering terrorism financ-
ing rather than merely complying with regulations.227 But such efforts will 
be ineffective if the United States does not also work with other nations to 
avoid an international race to the bottom in enforcing identity requirements 
for the formation of shell companies.228 As this study has demonstrated, a 
warning that the IRS requires identity documentation actually affected 
compliance rates, whereas a warning that international laws required 
identity documentation had no effect at all. These findings suggest that 
domestic regulation is far more effective than international regulation at 
enforcing identity requirements.229 Though coordinated implementation of 
identity reporting requirements will undoubtedly prove difficult, domestic 
regulation is crucial if nations wish to prevent the funding of terror.  
 
226 See Lacey & George, supra note 120, at 347 (suggesting that a transaction deemed “suspi-
cious” could require that the parties provide additional information). 
227 See Richard Barrett, Time to Reexamine Regulation Designed to Counter the Financing of Ter-
rorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 7, 18 (2009) (“Financial institutions have as much interest in 
preventing terrorist attacks as any other sector of society . . . . All sides would benefit if the 
suspicious activity reports submitted by banks and similar bodies were based on real concerns of 
possible criminality rather than the fear of falling short of the regulators’ expectations.”). 
228 International cooperation and uniformity are particularly important for anti–money 
laundering standards to fight terrorist financing. See Lacey & George, supra note 120, at 349-50.  
229 To make international regulations more effective, we must “re-conceptualiz[e] the public 
good of open financial systems as having negative security externalities that must be collectively 
managed.” Clunan, supra note 63, at 570-71. Collective management will be difficult, but one 
common suggestion is to have “a multilateral organization . . . draft a comprehensive anti-money 
laundering convention, and then have signatory nations to the convention adopt implementing 
domestic legislation.” Lacey & George, supra note 120, at 349-50. Such a convention could  
diminish enforcement difficulties and facilitate cooperation between nations in en-
forcement by including provisions for domestic governments to obtain the necessary 
evidence to investigate and prosecute cases where the evidence is in a foreign juris-
diction. Formal monitoring procedures to track the compliance of signatories in 
adopting the necessary implementing legislation are a necessary component. 
Id. at 350. This convention would, in turn, help increase compliance on the domestic front.  
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APPENDIX 
A. Placebo/Control  
Dear Rapid Filing Inc.: 
 
I am a consultant in need of an international corporation. I am a Sweden 
resident and I operate my business here with two associate [sic]. I have 
contacted you because I have several international clients in your region. 
Recently, our business has grown and tax [sic] have become more burdensome.  
Also I hope to limit my liability, and I think that incorporation is the 
best solution. I am eager to maintain business confidentiality and to keep 
the process as discrete as possible.  
I would specifically like to know what identifying documents you will 
require and what the costs will be. Due to a heavy upcoming travel schedule, 
the best way to reach me will be via email.  
I look forward to hearing from you.  
 
[Alias] 
B. Terrorism Treatment 
Dear Incorporation Value Company:  
 
My name is Ahmed Haddad. I am [sic] resident of Saudi Arabia and a 
Lebanese national and I consult for several businesses here, though we also 
have many international clients. We consult for a number of Muslim aid 
organizations.  
I am contacting you because our business in your area has recently in-
creasing [sic]. I have been exploring different options for the establishment 
of an international corporation. My business associates and I wish to 
incorporate for tax purposes and liability reasons. We also wish to limit 
disclosure of information as much as possible as we form this company.  
What specific identifying documentation do you require for us to form 
this corporation? How much will the service cost? Due to my heavy travel 
schedule, email is the best way to reach me. 
 
Thank you for your time.  
 
[Alias] 
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C.  FATF Treatment 
Dear Incorporation Value Company:  
 
I am contacting you regarding a business I am trying to set up. I am a con-
sultant and my colleagues and I are seeking to establish an international 
corporation. I am a [Norstralia] resident, but I do business both locally and with 
some international client [sic], including some in your region. Our business has 
been growing substantially, and our goal is to limit tax obligations and business 
liability. We would like as much business confidentiality as possible in these 
early stages of formation. My Internet searches show that the international 
Financial Action Task Force requires disclosure of identifying information. But 
I would rather not provide any detailed personal information if possible. 
 
So, we would like to know what identifying documents will be required to 
establish this company. We would also like to know what start-up costs will be. 
Due to my travel schedule, email will be the best way to reach me. I look 
forward to hearing from you soon. 
 
Regards, 
 
[Alias] 
D.  IRS Treatment 
Dear Incorporation Value Company:  
 
I am writing on behalf of myself and the other two associates of our small 
consulting business, currently based in [Norstralia]. We do work in your area, so 
my purpose in writing is to request assistance and direction on incorporation 
internationally—although we live and operate in [Norstralia], international 
incorporation is the best thing for our business right now since we are taking on 
more clients, and for tax purposes, as well as to limit liability. We would like to 
form a new company in your area as private individuals. Additionally, we'd like 
to make this process as private and confidential as possible. My Internet 
searches show that United States law, enforced by the Internal Revenue Service, 
requires disclosure of identifying information when forming a company. But I 
would like to avoid providing any detailed personal information if possible. 
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Can you please inform me which identification documents will be required 
by you and how much your services will cost? It will be much easier for you to 
reach me via email than on the phone.  
 
Thanks in advance. 
 
[Alias] 
E. Response Emails 
1. Indignant Response 
Dear [Alias]  
 
I am assuming that your email was completely fraudulent.  
If I am incorrect and this is not the case, please contact me on the num-
ber below and I will endeavour to assist.  
However, if you [sic] indeed your intention behind contacting me is to 
make a lazy, fraudelent [sic] buck at the expense of others, then please spare 
a thought for the prospect you will remain a complete, impoverished idiot 
for the reseof [sic] your life and die poor and sad.  
I will be leaving you nothing in my will. 
2. Greedy Response 
Your started [sic] purpose could well be a front for funding terrorism, 
and who the f*** would get involved in that? Seriously, if you wanted a 
functioning and useful Florida corporation you’d need someone here to put 
their name on it, set up bank accounts, etc. I wouldn’t even consider doing 
that for less that 5k a month, and I doubt you are going to find any suckers 
that will do it for less, if at all. If you are working with less than serious 
money, don’t waste anybody’s time here. Using a f ****** google account also 
shows you are just a f ****** poser and loser. If you have a serious proposal, 
write it up and we will consider it. Your previous message and this one are 
meaningless crap. Get a clue. Just how stupid do you think we are? 
3. Compliant Response 
Herewith, the requisite forms for your [sic] to complete. The identifying 
documents you must send are as follows: 1. Certified copies of the infor-
mation pages of your passport or of your driver’s license 2. Certified copies 
of two utility bills or other, showing your usual place or residence 3. Two 
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reference letters, one from a bank and the other form a business or other 
associate. Have these sent directly to us from [sic] the persons giving the 
same. Please remit half of the fee at this time (see wire instructions below). 
4. Partially Compliant Response 
Thank you for your enquiries. The Seychelles jurisdiction does not re-
quire disclosure of any documents and particulars of clients to any authority 
whatsoever save upon a Court Order for purposes of criminal investigation 
and money laundering. Your type of transactions that you wish to use the 
proposed company is ideal for a Seychelles International Business Compa-
ny. This kind of company pays zero tax, does not require annual return of 
accounts, does not disclose the Directors and Shareholders. You can open a 
bank account in its name and make use of a credit card to access your funds 
as you wish. As your Registered Agent, we are required by Law to maintain 
details of our clients for our own protection. To incorporate the company we 
require scanned copies of your passport, proof of your residential address 
(not post office box address) by way of a utility bill drawn on your name and 
if it is in a non English language, it needs to be translated and notarized 
before a Notary in your country. Given the nature of your proposed business 
transactions, we are willing to offer our services for the sum of Euro 600 per 
year. This will include the following services: 1. Incorporation 2. Registered 
Office 3. Registered Agent 4. Opening of Bank Accounts is a separate 
service at Euro 200 per account. We trust you will find our quote reasonable 
and we look forward to hearing from you. 
5. Noncompliant Responses 
a. Response 1 
We don’t need a whole lot of info from you. You can place the order on 
our website under starting your company. It should only take 10 minutes 
and that is all the information we need from you. 
b. Response 2 
All that you need to do is to provide the name you want for your new 
company, that’s it. 
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c. Response 3 
We have many international clients with the same confidentiality con-
cerns so I am happy to tell you that you have found the right service 
provider for your needs! 
F. Response Data 
Tables 2 and 3 below present the international and domestic compliance 
results. We cataloged responses as Noncompliant, Part-Compliant, Compliant, 
Refusal, or No Response. The tables also compare the compliance results 
across each of the treatments. Proportions that are statistically significant 
when measured against the benchmark placebo are indicated at the p < .01, 
the p < .05, and the p < .1 levels. The .01 level means, in essence, that there is 
1/100 probability that the results were produced by random chance rather 
than by a meaningful treatment effect. The .05 level indicates a weaker 
significance, with the probability of the results being produced by random 
chance at 1/20. The .1 level indicates an even weaker significance, with the 
probability of variation being the result of random chance at 1/10.  
 
Table 2: Experimental results by treatment and outcome  
category for the international samples230 
 
Treatment Total Noncompliant Part-Compliant Compliant Refusal No Response 
Placebo 1114 97 
(8.7%) 
185 
(16.6%) 
211 
(18.9%) 
125 
(11.2%) 
496 
(44.5%) 
Terrorism 425 24** 
(5.6%) 
47*** 
(11.1%) 
64* 
(15.1%) 
43 
(10.1%) 
247*** 
(58.1%) 
FATF 390 36 
(9.2%) 
60 
(15.4%) 
66 
(16.9%) 
37 
(9.5%) 
191 
(49.0%) 
Asterisks denote statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 in two-tailed–difference-in-mean 
tests compared to the placebo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 In each cell, we include both the total number of observations and the associated percentage 
of CSPs.  
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Table 3: Experimental results by treatment and outcome  
category for the domestic samples231 
 
Treatment Total Noncompliant Part-Compliant Compliant Refusal No Response 
Placebo 816 92 
(11.3%) 
13 
(1.6%) 
3 
(0.4%) 
106 
(13.0%) 
602 
(73.8%) 
Terrorism 550 32*** 
(5.8%) 
8 
(1.5%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
50** 
(9.1%) 
458*** 
(83.3%) 
FATF 546 54 
(9.9%) 
11 
(2.0%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
62 
(11.4%) 
417 
(76.4%) 
IRS 552 42** 
(7.6%) 
12 
(2.2%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
54* 
(9.8%) 
442*** 
(80.0%) 
Asterisks denote statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 in two-tailed–difference-in-mean 
tests compared to the placebo. 
 
 
231 In each cell, we include both the total number of observations and the associated percentage 
of CSPs.  
